

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

THE CUBAN DILEMMA

by

Ronald Lee Brown

Thesis Advisor:

Edward J. Laurance

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The research is intended to serve as a methodological and informational tool to aid the policymaker and/or intelligence officer in assessing the current disposition of a specific country towards other world actor/s.

The Cuban Dilemma

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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INTRODUCTION

The significance of Cuba in the present-day world is far greater than its size or population would indicate. What occurred in this Caribbean nation with the coming to power of the revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro attracted world-wide attention; and, the questions and conflicts that swirled about this event, as well as the success or failure of the Cuban Revolution, became among the most important and controversial issues of our times.

The Revolution is important, first of all, because of the immense changes it wrought in Cuban society. It was a profound social, economic, and political revolution which destroyed forever the older patterns of life on the island and carried with it enormous implications for the future. The Revolution affected every mode of Cuban existence and all of its people, some for the better, others for the worse.

But the impact of the Revolution was felt far beyond Cuban shores. Cuba was the first openly Communist state in the Western Hemisphere and the first Latin American ally of the Soviet Union and, as such, a center of contention between the super powers. As a pawn in the Cold War, Cuba was bartered and manipulated by the two super powers,

while the interests of Cuba herself were generally ignored. This was most notable during the 1962 missile crisis when the United States and the Soviet Union stood "eyeball to eyeball" while the world tensely waited to see who would blink first or whether the confrontation would result in nuclear war. Cuba remains a center of contention in the Cold War and/or detente and in the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, as well as a focus of crisis and upheaval throughout the Caribbean and Latin American region.

Cuba has also attracted the attention of third world leaders from Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a possible model for rapid social and economic development. In an era when the aspirations and demands of the peoples of the underdeveloped nations--the "revolution of rising expectations"--have reached higher and more intense proportions, the Cuban experiment is being watched closely not only in the Western Hemisphere but in other developing countries as well. Whether these emerging nations will be able to achieve change through more or less democratic and evolutionary means or join Cuba in the resort to dictatorial and violent methods is a crucial issue, by no means fully decided.

The Cuban Revolution and the Castro regime, further, have increased the complexity of political development and

modernization in Latin America and possibly dimmed the prospects for the growth of democracy in the area; now, a third force--one which favors totalitarian methods and close alliances with the Communist nations--has been injected into the struggle. Democratic development was made more difficult because the extreme left Fidelistas and Communists frequently worked in concert with the traditional conservative forces to penetrate the middle way of the social democrats and to provoke coups against those moderately reformist governments that seemed to be providing a Democratic alternative to Communism.

The major reasons for Cuba's significance are inter-related. The many exiles from Castro's Cuba, for instance, have helped exacerbate tensions in the Caribbean and have become important political forces in the countries where they have settled; by the same token, the issues of "Communism" and "Fidelista infiltration" have proved extremely divisive and troublesome in many of the Latin American nations. In some, guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism--with the inspiration and frequently the training and equipment derived from Cuba--have also proved disruptive and brought on increased United States intervention in a period of rising nationalism. At the same time the Soviet Union clearly has a large stake in seeing that the Cuban

experiment succeeds, while the United States has an interest in seeing that the Revolution and other similar movements in Latin America fail. What happens in Cuba, therefore, has enormous implications not only for Cuba herself, but for the United States and the Soviet Union, for Latin America, and for much of the underdeveloped world. [Ref.55, p. 229-231]

I. HEMISPHERIC - CUBAN RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years after Fidel Castro's rise to power, Washington and Havana remain virtually deadlocked in mutually uncompromising positions. The continuing climate of recriminations and reprisals in U.S. - Cuban relations now stands in sharp contrast with the dramatic and sudden thaw in U.S. - Chinese relations, and detente with the USSR. Nevertheless, until just recently, the state of affairs between the two countries could be summed up in a dialogue between President Nixon and Castro in April 1971. President Nixon stated that Havana's policies precluded the type of initiatives then underway toward China. The President pointedly noted that Castro "was still exporting revolution" and that "until Cuba changes their policy toward us we are not going to change our policy toward Cuba." Three days later, Castro responded by vehemently reaffirming Cuba's "solidarity" with the Latin American revolutionary movement, adding that Cuba could in fact afford to "scorn relations with the imperialist government of an empire on the decline and defeated on every front." [Ref. 17, p. 722]

A more recent indication of this lack of accommodation between the two countries is apparent after analyzing two recent news events which received worldwide attention. The first involves the State Department approval of automobile sales by subsidiaries of the "Big Three" U.S. automakers. Naturally, this evoked favorable endorsement by many of the world's leading political analysts, some of which went so far as to suggest that such a maneuver could possibly indicate a significant change in U.S. resolve. Rather than let such comments go without clarification, the State Department immediately stated that "the deal is not really that important and certainly it should not be interpreted as a change in U.S. policy towards Cuba."

[/Ref. 25, p.2/

The second instance involves a statement made by the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Dr. Fernandez Lopez Maino. In summary, he stated that Cuba would be willing to talk with the United States about a resumption of relations if the 12 year old economic embargo were to be removed. He also said that the continued U.S. presence at the Guantanamo Naval Base would not preclude talks. "We are not in a holy war with the U.S., but we will never undertake negotiations while the blockade is in effect," Lopez said.

[/Ref. 35, p. 10/

In only a matter of a few days, Lopez, sounding like a man who had spoken to his Foreign Office, virtually denied making such statements and accused the capitalist news agencies of "distorting" and "misinterpreting his words." [Ref. 35, p. 10] It is this type of "feeler football" which, in the past, has kept the official position of the two countries firmly at odds with one another. The situation can be briefly summarized as one in which each country is assuredly careful not to have any statement or indications attributed to it, for fear that it may be accused of foregoing it's previous "hardline" position and succumbing to the opposition.

Nevertheless, the events of recent months have pointed toward a less antagonistic relationship. This began with the resignation of former President Nixon; the September visit to Cuba by two U.S. senators, the first trip of its kind in fourteen years; the subsequent release of American political prisoners; and finally, intermittent signs from Cuba that it was no longer inflexibly opposed to improved relations. These were indicated by Castro when he inferred that the time may be ripe for an improvement in Cuban-American relations. In contrast to President Nixon, President Ford "is not involved with the Cuban counter-revolutionary elements," Castro said.

"Nixon was personally very much involved with them. And we see in Ford a man who is above this. . ."

"In our opinion, we see Ford with a certain hope in the sense that he may after all adopt a different policy towards Cuba, and that at least he does not have the personal involvement that Nixon had in this regard." Ref.
9, p. 37

In this chapter I wish to take a closer look at the background and present status of the rift between the U.S. and Cuba, while specifically examining the political, ideological, economic and military ramifications, and their implications on the other Latin American countries. I shall also focus on the so-called pay-offs and costs that must be considered before any future improved relations can be expected to materialize.

B. BACKGROUND

Notwithstanding the rhetoric which transpires between the two countries, the United States may now need to re-examine its own vital interests in the light of recent Cuban developments. As evidenced by recent events, both the U.S. and Cuba appear to be developing limited common interests that could be exploited by a more flexible U.S. policy. For the present however, the policies of the two countries seem to be based on antagonistic stances having

their origins in the past, many of which no longer appear to be a credit to their respective national interest. [Ref. 17, p. 723] Regardless of these observations, neither the U.S. nor Havana appear to intend to be the one that makes the first move. Since this apparent standoff has transfixed U.S.-Cuban relations for well over a decade, it may be of benefit to examine the present state of affairs and where it is leading us.

The goals and purposes of the U.S. posture could properly be described as dynamic, since the Castro takeover. In the early 1960's, as evidenced by the Bay of Pigs invasion, it was clear that the overthrow of the Castro government was the primary objective of the U.S.; at present, although "getting rid of Castro" may still be utmost in the minds of many politicians and administrators, the facts must be faced in that the Cuban Revolution is here to stay. Fortunately, for those who support the Revolution and unfortunately for those who do not, U.S. policy cannot be based on a decreasingly probable expectation of a drastic change of government in Cuba in the near future.

C. PRESENT POLICY GOALS

In view of this fact, what has been the rationale and what have been the goals of our recent policy? The

"official" thinking seems to be focused on the following three goals: Ref. 15, p. 193

1. To isolate the "revolutionary virus", thus protecting other peoples and nations from the spread of Castroite activities, influence and revolution.
2. To make the Cuban developmental effort as costly and sluggish as possible, thus both discrediting the Cuban model and weakening the legitimacy of the current regime. (In official circles, it is thought that progress toward this goal should contribute toward goal number one).
3. To embarrass, instruct and increase costs to the Soviet Union by forcing the Russians to "relate to" and support a Communist government that they cannot easily control, and which might in fact, prove to be a developmental failure. Again, progress toward goal number two should contribute (in official view) toward goal number three.*

Let us now take a brief look at the actual practices which comprise the official posture toward Cuba and distinguish them from the three forementioned goals. A

* Publicly, United States officials do not usually articulate and defend the United States posture towards Cuba in terms of any except the first of these three goals.

summary of official, public practices currently in force would include at a minimum, the following:

1. No diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba (the Swiss represent U.S. Interests).
2. No monetary, trade or commercial relations with Cuba except as specifically authorized by the President or his representatives.
3. No travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba except as specifically authorized by the Department of State.
4. Various administrative and political pressure brought to bear on governments that sell, ship and otherwise furnish goods to the Castro government, and
5. Exclusion of the Castro government from participation in the Inter-American system (through a series of OAS resolutions directly attributable to actions taken by the U.S.).

D. CONGRUENCY OF PRACTICES WITH GOALS

The basic distinction between a set of goals and a set of practices (not necessarily related to those goals) brings to mind one question of utmost significance:

TO WHAT EXTENT DO CURRENT PRACTICES ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOALS SET OUT?

The fact is, the practices enumerated above represent largely an accumulation of retaliatory decisions, accidents, antagonisms, and inattentions that certainly should not be construed as linking a rational means to an end. The actual means, primarily the economic embargo, has in fact, been irrelevant to Cuba's external relations. By perpetrating a direct and now purposeless injury on the Cuban people, we have violated one of our traditional principles of warfare which is noncombatant or civilian immunity. "The U.S. embargo has become a massive, indiscriminate tool which injures all Cubans resident on the island." [Ref. 11, p. 113]

One should not conclude from the foregoing that the embargo was always a purposeless policy. As a matter of fact, with regard to the policies of the late Eisenhower and early Kennedy administrations, the embargo actually represents a de-escalation. As a sign of flexibility and moderation, it sought to appropriately respond to the ever-present and increasing dangers of export of revolution from Cuba. The policy had narrower and--it seemed then--more achievable goals than preceeding policies, in that it used butter rather than guns to fight Cuba's external policies. Although the means and ends seemed appropriate for the time, the embargo has shown itself to

be inappropriate with the passing of time. It has failed the test proportionality. /Ref. 11 p. 113/

One would be equally incorrect in concluding that the accidental and retaliatory nature of our practiced goals necessarily implies that they have not contributed to the articulated goals. However, the extent to which these goals have been achieved have only been remotely related to the practices employed. A prime example of this is the failure of Castro inspired armed rebellion and guerilla activities, which can more properly be explained by the technological and tactical sophistication of U.S.-Latin American military teams, the opposition of the Soviet Union to armed struggle in the hemisphere, the nationalism of many of the politically oriented Latin Americans, and the difficulty of politicizing peasant populations. In other words, the necessary "objective ingredients" for the spread of Castroism were not sufficiently exploited; thus, any success achieved in containing Castroism should not be attributed to diplomatic, economic or cultural isolation of the regime. Additionally, it appears that Cuban mismanagement, economic idealism, precipitous centralization, problems with East European trading partners along with natural disasters, have been largely responsible for the sluggishness and costliness of the Cuban economy. /Ref. 15, p. 194/

E. UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT POLICY

WHAT ARE SOME OF THE LESS DESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES AND UNANTICIPATED COSTS OF THE PRACTICES NOW ENGAGED IN? This appears to be the next logical step in examining both sides of this situation. The opposition and hostility of the U.S. apparently benefits the Cuban regime in at least two ways. First, a sense of emergency has been created which stimulates and reinforces a sense of solidarity or of "being in it together." Second, the leadership is frequently being spared from having to face the consequences of its own mistakes because the opposition and hostility of the U.S. are readily exploited to explain shortcomings and existing problems. [Ref. 15, p. 195]

In this vein, it should also be noted that in the post-1959 period, a new generation of technical and military elite has emerged who simply may not subscribe to older fidelistas' intense antipathy toward the "Colossus of the North," and who may now be attracted by the Chinese precedent. [Ref. 17, p. 733] Thus, for these older and younger elements in the Cuban leadership, some form of accommodation with the U.S. may present the only possibility for improvement of Cuba's economic situation, lessening her dependence on Moscow, and undercutting the further rise of pro-Soviet elements on the island. Castro flatly rejects such a

solution as a "surrender" to the U.S. In the meantime, the preservation of Cuba's revolutionary posture requires some level of external tension with the U.S.

One of the supreme ironies of the present Cuban situation then, is that any accommodative rather than an aggressive U.S. approach could confront Castro with such difficult choices that it might indeed pose a more threatening situation. [Ref. 17 p. 733] In summary, we can say that Castro's defiant posture serves a twofold purpose; it deters moderate elements from seeking any form of rapprochement with the U.S., while at the same time, it discourages Washington from adopting a more conciliatory approach toward Cuba.

Of concern to the U.S. is the amount of prestige that is being lost and the considerable degree of ill-will generated both in Western Europe and in Latin America as a result of the almost unilateral attempts to "interdict" the Castro government. In spite of the perceived high cost of persuading the Europeans to fully cooperate in the policy of economic denial, the U.S. decision-makers nevertheless apply pressure to otherwise friendly governments in hopes that they will climb on the anti-Cuban bandwagon in some fashion. As a result of U.S. success in influencing and instituting guiding sanctions and punitive measures

against Cuba through the OAS, many Latin Americans unquestionably feel ill-used by the manner in which they came to have-- and now must operate with--a Cuban policy not of their making.

[/Ref. 15, p. 195/

It would appear that any restraints which our European allies exercise in their trading with Cuba are more a result of Cuba's ability to pay, than our policy of economic denial, or our allusions to Cuba's Soviet military dependency and commitment to the export of violent revolution. This can be verified by the fact that Western European trade with Cuba is increasing at the rate of 20 million dollars per year. Other non-Communist countries have now extended some 200 million dollars in commercial credit to Cuba, as evidence of their belief in Fidel's ability to produce and sell not only Cuban sugar, but also Cuban beef, seafood, citrus fruit and nickel. British-built fishing boats are on Cuban seas, and European-built machines of all kinds are serving the Cuban market. Canada and Mexico, two of the most productive and influential of the hemispheric states, have been exporting foodstuffs to Cuba, and both appear to be experiencing more unrest as a result of U.S. and other hemispheric restrictive pressures. [/Ref. 39 p. 243/

In conclusion, Viator states,

that so long as the boycott continues, there will persist in this island a sort of seige mentality; this undoubtedly makes it easier for the regime to organize--as they are now doing--the economic life of the country on a military basis designed to secure the maximum effort during the critical year or two to come. It also provides the Government with a ready-made excuse for economic failures. /Ref. 53 p. 321/

F. REQUISITES FOR NEGOTIATION

In spite of our outdated policy, the U.S. views have undergone several modifications since its institution. Today, Washington concedes that the Castro regime seems entrenched, and it no longer insists--as originally formulated in 1964--that Cuba break her military, economic and political dependence on the USSR. Nevertheless, there are still two "preconditions" which also have to be met before the U.S. would consider altering its present policy. First, the cessation of Cuban "mischief-making" attempts to "export revolution" in the hemisphere. Currently claimed as the prime objective of our policy, and at the same time, the end of such mischief-making is frequently referred to by U.S. officials as a "requisite" to any normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations. This appears to be somewhat of a sterile, unproductive approach for the following reason. If Cuban "hemispheric hooliganizm" is really as bad as we officially see it, then its termination or containment

should become a goal of our policy and not a prior condition to which the other side may not wish to agree. On the other hand, if we honestly admit that the punitive measures were imposed for reasons other than "hemispheric hooliganism", the Cubans could insist on the lifting of these measures as a requisite for reciprocal termination of "hooliganism". The second precondition is that Cuba must cease its dependence on the Soviet Union for a substantial portion of its economic and military well-being. However, official attitudes vary on this point since there are many who seem satisfied to see the Soviet Union burdened and occasionally embarrassed by the Cubans, while on the other hand, many officials emphasize the "unacceptability" of the current Soviet presence in Cuba. [Ref. 15, p. 196] It appears evident that a more sound policy would concentrate on lessening the Soviet presence rather than trying to use it to burden or discredit the Soviets. Again, however, it must be emphasized that nothing is to be gained or realized by requiring the Cubans to renounce Soviet aid as a requisite to normalized relations with the U.S. No matter how much Cuba might favor the latter, under present circumstances, they cannot afford to do the former.

G. EXPORT OF REVOLUTION

I have deferred further discussion of Soviet penetration

to the following chapter on the Soviet-Cuban relationship, and have proceeded to focus on the first of these two preconditions. It can be generally stated that Havana's revolutionary subversion of the hemisphere is no longer the threat that it was during the 1960's. Cuba's removal from active pursuit of the guerrilla path in Latin America can be attributed to five basic reasons: [Ref. 11 p. 105]

1. Cuba's increasing concern with its own development.
2. The defeat of Guevara and other key guerrilla personalities.
3. Effective U.S. counterinsurgency support to governments engaged in fighting guerrillas. (These international guerrilla efforts must be differentiated from our Cuban policy since they are aimed at other Communist countries as well.)
4. Over the past fourteen years it appears that the closeness of relations with the Soviet Union are inversely proportional to Cuba's support of guerrilla movements.
5. Tendency towards status quo of Latin American governments.

Most of these reasons are self-explanatory with the exception of the last two, which I believe, warrant further discussion.

In the past Castro was able to exercise considerable

independence in pursuing his own foreign and domestic policies, and on occasion challenged Moscow whenever it was in his interest and capacity to do so. He even went to the extreme of purging the pro-Soviet "microfaction" in early 1968, making verbal attacks on pro-Moscow Communist Parties and derogatory statements about some of the Latin American countries with which the Soviet Union was trying to improve overall relations. But, since then he has not possessed adequate bargaining measures. Owing to repeated economic failures over the last four years--and most critically, to the failure to produce the ten-million ton sugar harvest in 1970--his regime has been forced into a position of growing subordination to the Soviets. [Ref. 17 p. 731] The result of this has been more participation in Cuban foreign and domestic policymaking and a general tendency to "eliminate the options" available to the Castro regime for independent action.

The Castro movement in Cuba had had a deep and obvious appeal to many Latin Americans. Castro, the man, was cast to their tastes, in the classical Spanish heroic mold: individualistic, personally courageous, emotional, eloquent, and messianic. They rather enjoyed the prospect of a Latin American country, any Latin American country, standing up to the United States, regardless of the issue. They tended

to sympathize with Castro's thesis that American business interests had dominated the economy long enough, and most Latin Americans felt that what happened in a small, historically unstable country was really not terribly important anyway. However, Castro's eloquence was found to be a mask for mendacity, as he announced himself a Marxist, shaped his regime in the pattern of Soviet-style socialism, and dropped all pretense of a free press and the elements of constitutional democracy. Then, in a clumsy, overt way, the Castro government began to meddle in the internal affairs of other governments of Latin America. "Interventionism" suddenly assumed two new facets. This interference was Cuban, and intervention was no longer viewable as a United States monopoly. And, for the first time, the conservative nature of the Latin American governments prompted them to ask themselves whether they too ought to do some intervening in order to keep the Castro situation in hand. They responded through the OAS by cutting off diplomatic relations with Havana.

H. INCONSISTENCY OF GOALS

The U.S. policy goals must now be viewed as internally incompatible. The effort to reduce Soviet influence in Cuba may increase the probability of Cuban international recklessness since the reduction of Cuban militance seems

to be a direct function of its increasing Sovietization. In other words, by insisting on Cuba's continued hemispheric isolation, the U.S. has contributed to a situation whereby Havana, in effect, is being encouraged to pursue revolutionary rather than diplomatic interest in Latin America. Equally important, the U.S. remarks have contained no signal to the Cubans that the issue of increased Soviet military-political penetration and not the issue of "exporting revolution"--whether symbolic or actually implemented--has now become the most objectionable factor in the Cuban situation. Regardless of this omission, our policy instruments are counterproductive in that they fail to provide any incentives for Cuba to behave in such a way as to achieve either goal.

I. COSTS AND SACRIFICES WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED BY CONCERNED PARTIES

I would now like to address several important factors that must be considered as obstructions, or at best, adverse reactions to the openings of constructive dialogue between the two countries. These can best be lumped into the following broad areas, military, domestic, and ideological/political.

1. Military

Cuba is aligned with a foreign power that is dedicated to the destruction of American democracy. Soviet military

personnel serve in advisory capacities to Cuba's sizeable, well trained, well equipped army. Soviet Russia has attempted to capitalize on the geographic position of the island to alter the world balance of power by neutralizing some of the strategic advantages the United States has enjoyed in overseas bases and missile strength.

Cuba's armed forces of course, regardless of their strength or ability, pose little threat to the United States. In a conventional war, Cuba could at best, provide a diversionary effort. The island could be easily neutralized but not without cost of lives and equipment. In terms of nuclear war, the island's location gives Russia the advantage of dispersal for its weapon systems. Close proximity to the United States gives an added advantage in that relatively cheap, more accurate, short range or intermediate range missiles may be effectively deployed against the United States. The missile crisis dramatically demonstrated that it is possible to secretly transport and emplace nuclear missiles. In a one shot nuclear war, such missiles could have devastating results for the United States. In this context, the island has assumed major strategic importance. Ref. 6 p. 206-208

There are many uses to which Cuba could be put by the Russians: Missile base, naval base, intelligence center,

tracking station and base for subversion come readily to mind. Already Cuba has experimented with many of these employments. As a base for subversion, Cuba has been successful in supplying men and equipment to cause trouble in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Panama, Bolivia and Chile. It is in this regard that Cuba poses its greatest threat to Latin America. Any attempt at large scale military invasion of another nation could be easily thwarted by the United States but covert infiltration of propaganda, sabotage and guerrillas is almost impossible to control.

For use by the United States, Cuba has little to offer. Guantanamo Bay (Gitmo) is presently used for fleet refresher training and could easily be replaced by Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. As a base for long range patrol or for staging troops and equipment for Latin America deployment, Florida or Puerto Rico offer equal facilities. The island's time honored role of protecting the Panama Canal would be meaningless in a nuclear war and very minor in conventional conflict involving aircraft carriers and submarines.

The Cuban situation even if exploited to its fullest, could probably not affect the world balance of power. The strategic power of the United States does not depend on

what happens in Cuba. A strong Soviet military power in Cuba could however, divert sizeable segments of United States' military forces and the island could become a political pawn in, for instance, another Berlin crisis. [Ref. 6 p. 209-221] We must remember that it is not Castro himself, but the increased Soviet penetration of Cuba--which in turn could facilitate the development of even greater Soviet strategic capabilities in the Caribbean--that now severely endangers U.S. vital interest. In conclusion, we can say that although Cuba is not necessary to the United States as a base, in order to preclude future alarms and veiled threats to United States' security, Cuba should be denied as a base to a potential enemy.

2. Domestic

I will now focus on the domestic consideration which can provide a disincentive to Washington to change its policy. Primary among these is the large Cuban exile community, partly neighboring on the Florida White House. They have had ties with the conservative political opinion in the U.S. for sometime, and they also act as a powerful lobby against normalization of Cuban-U.S. relations. While for Castro their absence from Cuba lessened an internal threat to his regime, their presence in the U.S. makes settlement highly impossible without shouts of betrayal.

The Cuban exile communities have in effect reconstituted themselves as a "little Cuba", recreating the privileged structure and professional hierarchy that existed in pre-revolutionary Cuba. Their mini-world now exists as a pressure group to deny the present in the name of the past. [Ref. 24, p. 132-133] One such group, known as the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba provides a steady stream of alarmist reports: of Cuban caves chockablock with IRBM's, of secret Soviet submarine bases along the Cuban coasts, of the sinister implications of recent Soviet-Cuban discussions about providing Cubans with the knowledge and equipment necessary for exploring the uses of nuclear energy. [Ref. 39 p. 244] Such thinking is certainly ill-purposed and could be dangerous. It could well be that attempts to re-establish relations would unleash a series of invasion attempts that could only compromise the U.S.

3. Ideological/Political

The factors of greatest importance would probably be the political and ideological costs. Should the U.S. attempt accommodation with Cuba it would have to be prepared to treat Castro as a peer. Such a move would certainly be interpreted at home, most of Latin America and the world, as a tacit admission of failure and defeat of the U.S. by a fourth rate power. Implicit in such a movement,

however carefully conceived and implemented, is the conclusion that we would be prepared to accept Castro--despite his being an outspoken proponent of an ideology that we and our Latin American allies have formally and repeatedly branded as alien to the values and interests of the Western Hemisphere. We must recognize that we have been unable to accomplish Castro's failure; and because we have been committed to that failure for so long and so openly, we should have to anticipate that Fidel might be less than gracious in his victory.

Adverse reactions could be expected from many of the Latin American regimes, as well as the landowners, some businessmen, and representatives of traditional orders--who would be upset by any softening of our Cuban posture. Elements of the left would also be suspicious, not only because moves towards accommodation would desecrate their image of Fidel as being ideologically pure, but also because they desperately require the U.S. to be pictured as an intractably reactionary, imperialist enemy. [Ref. 39 p. 247]

In the U.S., numerous sectors of the public would inveigh against normalization of our relations with Cuba. If the radical right did not raise the cry of treason, it would surely appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, threats to our national security, to the American flag and American ideals.

From the left would come a barrage of deceit charges, dissimulation, and double-dealing. Some of our more radical groups such as the S.D.S., Black Panthers, etc., would express the view that no society as incurably corrupt and rotten as ours could possibly reach a sincere agreement with Fidel. [Ref. 39 p. 248] In conclusion we could surmise that an accord would demonstrate America's contention, that Castro's ideology was alien and dangerous to the values and interest of the Western Hemisphere, was false.

4. Economic

From a commercial viewpoint, Cuba has no overpowering value. After all, the United States has lived successfully for several years without benefit of Cuban trade. There is no denying that access to Cuban markets would be welcomed by United States' business; a market is a market, and businessmen and the United States' government are keenly aware that expansion is one answer to declining profits and restoration of a favorable trade balance.

Future mercantile transactions could not approach pre-Castro levels. Russian, British, French and Chinese products have been pouring into Cuba for years and it is not reasonable to believe that these goods or their spare parts could be completely replaced by United States' products. Cuban sugar has long been replaced by Latin American and

United States' sources. If Cuban sugar were to again be available, the United States could not purchase amounts equal to pre-1959 levels without alienating our present suppliers. Since sugar remains the major cash product of Cuba, whoever purchases the majority of Cuban sugar will also most probably be the major supplier of commodities to Cuba.

Finally it would not seem likely that American investors would again gamble large sums in a nation with Cuba's history of expropriation and debt repudiation. Even if American business was willing, we cannot gauge how readily Cuba would accept U.S. investments after years of a "Cubasi--Yanguino" national philosophy.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the President may well conclude that the costs are simply too heavy to bear at this time. Presently, he is under no great domestic political pressure to reach an accord with Castro, and he could not expect any great political reward for doing so.

It appears that the U.S., at acceptable costs, can maintain its present Cuban posture indefinitely. However, as the President is aware--and the American public should be--Fidel can just as readily maintain his intransigent posture toward the U.S. Fidel does not believe that his regime is endangered from within and he knows that the

Soviet Union will not abandon him. Thus he feels that time is on his side and not ours, and he can afford to wait. As he waits, he expects to see even larger and more meaningful exchange between Cuba and his worldwide trading partners. He expects to see growing disaffection for hemispheric Cuban policy in the U.S. and the Latin American countries. [Ref. 39 p. 248] In brief, he expects to see increasing isolation of the U.S. rather than Cuba, at least as far as Cuba is concerned.

J. BENEFITS AND PAYOFFS

If such are some of the important costs that we must consider, what corresponding benefits might we expect to justify such costs.

On the plus side of the ledger it would seem that an accord with Castro would remove a source of potential friction between the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, in terms of hemispheric solidarity, the agricultural and industrial potential of Cuba is of inestimable value to the development of some form of Caribbean trade or even political alliance. Were Cuba to rejoin the Caribbean, it would be possible to make long range economic plans which would fit Cuba's capabilities and limitations to the broader regional pattern in the interest of the greatest welfare for the whole area. Third, a relaxation of the United States'

attitude toward Cuba would ease relations with our allies who have continued trade with Cuba against United States wishes. Third World nations might also become more amenable to United States overtures if they no longer viewed Cuba a victim of U.S. aggression. [Ref. 24 p. 133-134] Fourth, although U.S. policy had no effect on Cuba's abandonment of militancy, it would probably help to insure the continuation of Cuban withdrawal from active guerrilla support, if it changed policy. Fifth, while recognizing that existing diplomatic channels are sufficient, it is obviously more effective if one has direct relations. Indeed, the argument for universal diplomatic relations (the Peking analogy)--with scoundrels as well as angels--is becoming more convincing. Additionally, it might open the door for more collaboration on specific functional problems, including repatriation of remaining American citizens and coordinated hurricane tracking. Sixth, even though Cuba was quite able to absorb a lot of pressure from the Soviet Union for a long time, it is quite probable that relations with the U.S. would give Cuba more bargaining power with the Soviets and perhaps aid in preventing that part of Sovietization which the Cubans would rather do without. [Ref. 11 p. 109]

K. PROGNOSIS

Since this is an age for designing scenarios with the

potentiality of reducing conflict, one might establish certain stages by means of which a re-establishment of normal relations between Cuba and the U.S. might occur. Moreover, we must acknowledge that whatever the form and however achieved, any process of accommodation with Castro is going to be slow, difficult and painful. It will have to be attained on the basis of incremental steps that are seen as reciprocally advantageous to us, to Castro, and to the other states of the hemisphere. It will also have to be achieved under the watchful eye of the Soviet Union.

Just as there was no historical precedent for isolating Cuba in the hemisphere, so there are no clear paths to follow if a decision is made to attempt a reintegration of the Castro regime under conditions that do not conform to the status quo ante.

II. SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

At the invitation of Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, and Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, paid an official friendly visit to Cuba from 28 January to 3 February 1974. Meetings and talks at Havana dealt with the state and prospects for development of Soviet-Cuban relations as well as a wide range of important international problems. The joint Soviet-Cuban Declaration signed at the end of the visit, recorded complete mutual understanding, unity of purpose of the USSR and the Republic of Cuba, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Cuba and their steadfast loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist teaching. It summed up the 15-year experience of truly internationalist cooperation between the world's first socialist country and Latin America's first socialist state. [Ref. 21.p. 3]

The Cuban purpose in inviting the globe-trotting Brezhnev for the new year in Havana was clear enough. For the 15th anniversary of the triumphant entry of his guerrillas

into Havana, Castro wanted the Kremlin chief as star guest to show his own people and the world that Cuban socialism had really made the grade. The Russians certainly have no expressed qualms about backing Castro--and have been doing so to the tune of well over one million dollars a day--a probable conservative estimate--since the early 1960's.

In giving Brezhnev an astonishing red carpet treatment, the Cubans have leaned over backwards to erase any awkward memories of moments when Soviet-Cuban relations were not quite so warm. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Fidel Castro, with his reputation for highly individual, if not downright wayward foreign policy departures, should at this stage of the Cuban revolution see the future of his country so closely identified with that of the Soviet Union. Of course, it must be recalled that for the past seven years--ever since the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in October 1967--Castro has been quietly and unobtrusively falling in with the Soviet Union's view of the world.

This chapter will investigate the evolution of the Soviet-Cuban alignment from 1960 to the present, and the impact of the United States and China on this developing relationship--with a prognosis of the effect of this relationship on future Soviet policy in Latin America. It will focus only on the highlights of this period which

have direct implications and/or ramifications on the continuing relationship between these two countries.

B. THE CUBAN-SOVIET ALIGNMENT

1. Pre 1959 Cuban-Communist Relations

We can sum up in a few words what we know of the relations between Cuba and the countries of the socialist camp up to February 1960. In 1959, a delegation of the Central Council of Soviet Trade Union left Moscow to take part in the celebration of 1 May in Havana, but because of visa difficulties, arrived after the celebrations had taken place. [Ref. 7 p. 436] In June of the same year, at a banquet given in Castro's honor by Cuban journalists, Kung Mai, "the representative in Cuba of the Chinese News Agency," sat next to Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, an influential Cuban Communist Party official. The following month a Chinese press delegation spent three weeks in Cuba and from then on the arrivals of journalists from Peking became so numerous that by November, according to C. P. Cabell of the CIA, the Chinese correspondents had set up their general headquarters in Havana. [Ref. 45 p. 82]

For their part, Cuban visitors to the Iron Curtain countries, almost all members of the Cuban Communist Party (PSP), initially showed their preference for Peking, as was to be expected in view of the excellent relations

maintained by the PSP with their Chinese comrades. [Ref. 45 p. 82] In October the PSP sent a delegation to China on the occasion of the anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic.

As for trade relations, the Soviet Union bought half a million tons of sugar in 1959, approximately the same as in 1955, but much more than it had bought in 1956, 1957 and 1958 when the figures were 235,000, 395,000 and 207,000 tons, respectively. At the end of 1959 the Chinese bought 50,000 tons.

I have cited these data simply as part of my current function as a "historian." They are of no real import. All such visits and transactions could have continued without affecting the evolution of Cuban affairs. Our question then is how and why was Castro and Cuba driven in, drawn in, or perhaps if we choose, forced into the Communist camp?

2. Post 1959 U.S. Communist-Cuban Relations

The Soviet Union failed to respond to Castro's early overtures with the speed or in the form that he wanted. One reason was surely that after the conversation between Khrushchev and Eisenhower in September 1959, Soviet-American relations were dominated for a time by the optimistic "spirit of Camp David." At such time Khrushchev would hardly endanger the chances of achieving some or all of his objectives through negotiation by showing an excessive

interest in the Caribbean. [Ref. 45 p. 83] Hence Cuban contacts with the Soviets developed slowly.

That there were difficulties involved is suggested by Castro's initiative at the beginning of December 1959, when he called a conference of underdeveloped countries. This was apparently a maneuver to heighten his own importance in Khrushchev's eyes by suggesting the role that Cuba might play in cooperating with Soviet foreign policy among the countries of the "third world." It seems unlikely that Castro would have launched this plan--which ended in a resounding failure--if he had been certain of a favorable Soviet response to his blandishments. [Ref. 18 p. 100]

On 15 December, it was announced that the Soviet trade exhibition would arrive in Cuba in January 1960. At the beginning of that month there arrived the "directors sent to prepare the exhibition," probably among them other Soviet agents who had been instructed to report on the state of affairs in Cuba. [Ref. 28 p. 221] Finally, on 4 February, Mikoyan arrived to open the exhibition. Nine days later he signed a trade agreement with the Cuban government. The USSR undertook to buy 425 thousand tons of sugar in 1960, and a million tons per year in the following four years. Further, the agreement provided for a Soviet credit to Cuba of \$100 million for the purchase of plants, machinery,

materials, and technical assistance. A communique was issued which announced that both nations would soon discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been broken off by Batista after his successful coup in March 1952. Ref. 45 p. 84

Even before Mikoyan had left Cuba, a delegation arrived from East Germany. In February, 1960, this delegation signed a financial and commercial agreement with Cuba. This was followed at the end of March by a similar agreement with Poland, thus showing that the establishment of ties with Cuba was now a general policy of the socialist camp, or at least of its European members. Ref. 45 p. 85

Following his assurance of backing from the Soviet Union--perhaps it was in exchange for such backing--the Castro regime unleashed a series of attacks upon the United States of unprecedented bitterness and fury. On 3 March, Guevara labeled the \$150 million annual subsidy the U.S. extended for Cuban sugar, "a form of economic enslavement." On 6 March, the French ship LE COUBRE, carrying seventy-six tons of ammunition purchased in Belgium, exploded at the dock in Havana. It was assumed to be a case of sabotage and blame was promptly directed towards the U.S. On 9-10 March, Castro questioned the U.S. jurisdictional rights over Guantanamo Bay naval base. Ref. 29 p. 280 On 18

March, Yugoslavia signed a commercial agreement with Cuba. It was the second socialist state to do so. On the same day, Castro, who was having trouble purchasing a helicopter from the U.S., was presented one as a gift from the USSR.

[/Ref. 22 p. 77/

It was announced on 25 March that a total of 130,000 tons of sugar were sold to China, thereby in effect inaugurating trade relations with Peking. On 1 April, the signing of a commercial agreement with Poland was announced, and on 3 April, the New York Times reported that the U.S. might cut off economic aid to Poland because of the agreement. [/Ref. 22 p. 77/

On 6 April, the Havana press revealed that 155,000 acres belonging to the United Fruit Company had been expropriated, with an offer of compensation of \$3.8 million in "agrarian reform" government bonds.* (This was the first significant chunk of American property to be affected by the agrarian reform of 17 May of the previous year.) [/Ref. 18 p. 115/

The secretary-general of the Chinese trade unions and a sizable delegation arrived in Havana from China on 22 April. On the same day a commercial agreement was signed with Japan, an old customer, calling for the sale of 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar over a three-year period, and for the first time,

* The amount never reached the bargaining stage, and there is no record that any agrarian reform bonds were ever printed.

the purchase of a sizable quantity of Japanese textiles among other items. American textile exporters were reportedly alarmed. The next day Castro announced that Cuba's foreign exchange reserves had risen from \$78 million in January 1959 to \$142 million. He was in a state of unabashed euphoria as he lashed out once more against American plans for aggression. Ref. 22 p. 77

On 7 May 1960, diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR were formally reestablished.

On 8 June, Khrushchev told a visiting Cuban official that the Soviet Union did not need missile bases in Cuba because "by pressing a button we can hit any spot on earth." This was followed on 9 July, by Khrushchev's first and often repeated public statement that, "figuratively speaking," the Soviet Union would flatten the U.S. with atomic missiles if Cuba were attacked. Of course, this statement was taken as "literally speaking" by the Cuban people, thereby enormously boosting their confidence in the wisdom of Fidel's foreign policy. Ref. 22 p. 78

By late June, Raul Castro began reporting success in his arms-purchasing mission behind the iron curtain. This was the last straw and it brought an end to the eighteen month "policy of patience" of the Eisenhower administration. The repeated offers (twenty-five of them) to negotiate all

outstanding differences with Cuba had gotten nowhere. This fact, coupled with the apparently willing drift of the Castro regime into the Soviet camp, obviously called for a drastic change of policy. [Ref. 29 p. 280]

It took another six months before the break between Cuba and the U.S. was complete, but the trend toward rupture was unmistakable in the summer of 1960. Highlights of a month-long crisis were: (1) June 22--President Eisenhower's request to Congress for authority to cut the Cuban sugar quota; (2) June 23--Castro's warning that he would retaliate by seizing all remaining U.S. holdings; (3) June 29--U.S. denunciation of Cuban slander before the OAS Peace Committee, and Cuban takeover of the Texaco oil refinery; (4) July 1--seizure of Standard Oil of New Jersey's Cuba refinery; (5) July 5--U.S. suspension of all Cuban sugar imports; (6) July 9--Khrushchev's declaration that the USSR would use rockets to halt military intervention in Cuba; (7) July 10--Eisenhower's statement that he would not tolerate a regime dominated by international Communism in the Western Hemisphere; (8) July 12--Khrushchev's pronouncement that the Monroe Doctrine "is dead"; (9) July 13--Communist China's trade-pact negotiations with Cuba; (10) July 18--Cuba's charge of U.S. invasion plans before the UN; (11) July 21--new Soviet pledges of military and economic support for Cuba. [Ref. 29 P. 281]

By August, the schism between Washington and Havana was so deep and the Cuban commitments to the Soviet bloc so broad that there could be no turning back. Charges and countercharges were exchanged before the UN in August and before the OAS in September. On October 19, the U.S. imposed an embargo on all exports to Cuba save food and medicine. By the end of the year Castro was hurriedly mobilizing the country in an anticipation of an invasion. [Ref. 29 p. 281] On 3 January 1961, following Castro's demand that the United States reduce its embassy staff in Havana to eleven, the Eisenhower administration severed diplomatic relations.

By this time, Cuba had gone nearly all the way in the process of conversion into a Soviet satellite state. Although not subject to the same degree of ultimate control that Moscow held over the satellites of Eastern Europe, it nevertheless followed the Soviet line in both domestic and foreign policy. Trade pacts had been made with nine Soviet-bloc nations, and the island was swarming with Soviet technicians. Soviet arms (including tanks and planes) had made Cuba, though no direct threat to the U.S., a military power to be reckoned with in Latin America. [Ref. 18 p. 120]

Cuba now possessed nearly all the features that characterized Communist states everywhere: a small, tightly organized

group ruling in the name of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," with complete absence of civil liberties and political freedom; state control and operation of commerce and industry and of workers' organizations; and an anti-American pro-Soviet line in foreign policy. By the end of 1960 the last Cuban stronghold of opposition to Communism, the Roman Catholic Church, was relentlessly and systematically being silenced. [Ref. 29 p. 282]

In summary then, we see that the initial Soviet attitude was somewhat ambivalent towards Cuba in 1959. This relationship was tightened through increased economic negotiations and agreements with the socialist countries into early 1960, culminating in reestablishment of diplomatic relations in May of that year. A near reversal of this situation transpired between the U.S. and Cuba during this same period. Increased political friction along with continuous corporate expropriations finally resulted in severance of diplomatic relations in early 1961.

3. U.S. Reaction

Meanwhile, American agencies had begun to support clandestinely, in collusion with the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua, the training and equipping of Cuban exile groups in preparation of a projected assault on the Castro regime. When the Kennedy administration

assumed office in January of 1961, it continued the preparations for an armed landing of anti-Castro forces in Cuba, ruling out any participation by U.S. forces in the fighting. Ref. 29 p. 285

In the third week of April the invasion took place on the southern coast of Cuba. In a very few days the invaders, about fifteen hundred strong, were utterly crushed by Castro's far superior military might. Not only was the whole operation an incredible military fiasco, but it was also a flagrant violation of the non-intervention principle to which the U.S. had repeatedly subscribed in various inter-American declarations and treaties. Ref. 29 p. 285 The participation of the U.S. was too limited to assure success but quite significant enough to make it impossible to refute the charge of intervention.

4. Castro's Marxist-Leninist Declaration

Generally, the year 1961 was not very favorable for Castro in Latin America. It is true that victory over the invasion forces in April considerably heightened his influence on the continent, but the ratification of the Alliance for Progress in August gave the U.S. government an effective means with which to persuade the Latin American governments to close ranks against Castroism. Ref. 45 p. 138

At the end of 1961, Castro faced a situation in which Cuba's admission to the socialist bloc was denied, the economic help given to Cuba was insufficient, conditions in Latin America were not particularly favorable for revolution, and the Communist "old guard," in spite of their internal differences, thought they were about to control the "backbone of the state." Castro once more decided to trust his luck and his audacity. /Ref. 18 p.125/

In a television appearance on 1 December 1961, he disclosed that he had always intuitively been a Marxist-Leninist, pledged that he would continue to be one until he died, and tried to dispel any doubts or reservations that might remain concerning his real ideological position. This, he evidently did to overcome the resistance of the socialist bloc, to establish himself as the leader of the Communist movement in Latin America, to maintain the initiative against the U.S., and incidently, to obtain from the Soviet bloc the consumer goods he needed so desperately. /Ref.45 p. 141/

Given the objectives we have imputed to Castro's speech, it appears to be a masterpiece. It proved, however, to be one of his most unfortunate public appearances. In Cuba his words were received with amazement. The international press misinterpreted them, reducing the whole speech to an

account of a monstrous hoax perpetrated on the Cuban people from an early date--a date that each commentator fixed arbitrarily for his own convenience. Ref. 45 p. 143

What was even worse for Castro was that his confession of faith did not have any effect on the attitude of the members of the Socialist bloc. On the fourth anniversary of the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Brezhnev and Khrushchev wished him only "success in the creation of a new society." Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai predicted victories "in the cause of the revolution and of construction," and even little Albania limited herself to congratulations on his efforts to "build a free life." Not a word about his "socialism." To top it off, a new round with the Soviets in the trade negotiations for 1962 ended at the beginning of January with no appreciable result.

Ref. 45 p. 143

In a response to the OAS agreement of 31 January 1962 by which Cuba was suspended from the inter-American organization, Castro proclaimed the Second Declaration of Havana, in which the growing differences between the Soviets and the Cuban leader were made even more evident. The same man who only two months before had recommended to all, the reading of Khrushchev reports to the CPSU, now failed to mention peaceful co-existence, "national democracy,"

"peaceful transition," or any of the other recommended Soviet formulas for the zones of the "third world" in his words to the peoples of Latin America. [Ref. 45 p. 145]

Briefly then, relations between Cuba and the two great powers of the socialist bloc remained unchanged. That is, toward the first anniversary of Castro's declaration on 16 April 1961, his "socialism" had not been officially recognized; the commercial agreements for 1962 with both countries had not been signed; and there were grave differences of opinion with the Soviet Union on such matters as general strategy and the extent of the protection that the Soviets should give to Cuba.

On 3 July 1962, it was announced that Raul Castro, accompanied by a delegation of Cuban army officers, was in Moscow, and had been received by Marshal Malinovsky, the Soviet Minister of Defense. All this obviously meant that the double crisis of Cuban-Soviet relations and of Castro's relations with the "old" Communists had been overcome. Some form of agreement must have been reached shortly before June 25, the day on which the atmosphere suddenly cleared. It is perhaps correct to assume that the decision to station missiles in Cuba formed part of the agreement, since Raul's appearance in Moscow in the first days of July was obviously connected with the decision.

We may further surmise that the terms of the agreement included acceptance of Castro as the supreme representative of Marxism-Leninism in Cuba and the relegation of their own agents, the "old Communists," to a secondary role. [Ref. 45 p. 160]

C. SOVIET-CUBAN DIFFERENCES

1. The Aftermath of The Missile Crisis

By mid-1962 Cuba had been suspended from the OAS; the majority of Latin American countries had broken diplomatic relations with Castro; his internal situation was deteriorating, and the prospects for a revolutionary movement on the continent were highly doubtful. At such a time it is futile to conjecture whether defensive considerations--the defense of the Cuban base, or offensive ones--to step up revolutionary activities on the continent, were decisive for him. [Ref. 45 p. 163]

The Missile Crisis, on the other hand, was a humiliation for which the Russians will never be forgiven. For the first, and thus far only time in his career, Fidel Castro allowed the power of decision to lie in other hands. What was worse, it lay in Russian, which is to say, in foreign hands. [Ref. 32 p. 200]

On the face of it, he seemed to be acting as a stooge of Moscow, introducing Communist power as well as Communist

ideology into the Western Hemisphere. What he did was recognized as an act of inexcusable recklessness. Although Cuba and the Soviet Union were, in fact, following the same policy for different reasons in the missile adventure, and although Castro did not in the least consider himself as a tool of Moscow, appearances were against him. [Ref. 32 p. 231]

The fact that the crisis was settled between Kennedy and Khrushchev, without Castro's being consulted at any stage, was a humiliation which demonstrated Fidel's and Cuba's weakness. In international terms, this was the lowest point that Fidel reached in his revolution. He knew it, and the knowledge rankled him. [Ref. 32 p. 232]

Castro had put forth an image of "machismo" to the entire world with his expertise in "handling" the U.S. previously, but this time the U.S. had taken a hard stand on the matter of the missiles. To be sure, Castro finally acquiesced but he had rejected the proposals for international inspection on Cuban soil of the dismantled missile bases, though he stated that it was the right of the Soviets to remove what was theirs from Cuban soil. He also had no objections to the removal of the Russian bombers since they too, were Soviet property; however, he was hardly pleased with the removal and accused the U.S. of trying to maintain tensions and prolong the crisis while

continuing its policy of force. As a result of all of this, Cuban-Soviet relations were so strained that Mikoyan was forced to return to Cuba in an effort to restore harmony. /Ref. 1 p. 215/

In defense of Cuba, the Chinese Communists criticized the Soviet action in the missile situation as a retreat from U.S. imperialism. With Castro siding with the Chinese, the Soviets were hard-pressed to maintain tranquility in the "family" and eventually Khrushchev was forced publicly to declare China an opponent of his efforts to prevent nuclear war. /Ref. 45 p. 172/

2. The Sino-Soviet Rift

Not fully satisfied with either Moscow or Peking, the Cuban leadership was unwilling to support either government in the momentous dispute that began to unfold publicly between them. Although Cuba officially entered the Soviet orbit in the spring of 1963, on some issues the Cubans still seemed to side with the Chinese, thus further inhibiting the development of smoother relations between Moscow and Havana. For the most part, however, in 1963 and 1964 they remained neutral in their response to the Sino-Soviet dispute. /Ref. 51 p. 441/

Reflecting upon Cuban dependence on the USSR, Soviet trade/aid accounted for about forty-five percent of Cuba's total trade from 1961-1964; China's share amounted to ten percent during the same period. Given Cuba's critical economic situation along with apparent Soviet reluctance to support the continuing Revolution, Cuba had no desire to antagonize the Chinese. But interest in Chinese friendship is not meant to imply that Cuba was growing closer to China during the 1961-64 period, since dealings with the Soviet bloc were generally more prominent during this time frame. In fact, the Cubans sided with Peking rather than Moscow only on the nuclear test ban treaty and the spread of revolution. [Ref. 51 p. 441]

It was not until after the fall of Khrushchev that Cuba slowly eased away from the Chinese way of thinking and back toward the Soviet fold. In late 1964, a conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America was held in Havana during which the Cuban Revolution and armed struggles were the main issues of discussion. The positions which the conference eventually adopted, represented agreement with Soviet policy at the expense of the Chinese. Cuba was willing to concur with the Soviet stand because of the official communique's praise and support of the Cuban Revolution and of the armed struggles proceeding on the Latin American continent.

Although the Communist Parties in attendance did not promise to follow the Cubans on all issues, the meeting nevertheless, gave a new standing and legitimacy within the Communist movement to the Cuban leadership and party organization. [Ref. 51 p. 441]

Concurrent with the sharp increase in Soviet-Cuban interaction, there was a striking decline in Chinese approval of the Castro regime and its external policies. By the end of 1964 Sino-Cuban relations had already reached their apogee; in early 1965 a waning of mutual attraction began and this continued through 1966, during which time the Chinese perceived that the Cubans were no longer neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese criticized the Cuban position on this matter and alleged Cuban compromise on the issue of aid to armed revolutions.

As if to re-establish Cuba's revolutionary credentials, Havana played host in January 1966 to the Tri-Continental Conference of Communist delegations meeting to promote the coordination of "national liberation wars." The Soviets were again attacked by Castro as he called for armed uprisings around the world. Castro was using the congress strictly as a means of promoting his guerrilla warfare position. The Soviets found that they were unable to control the Castro attack and quickly disassociated

themselves from the entire affair. [Ref. 42 p. 1142] From that time on until 1968 the Soviet-Cuban relationship worsened.

In retrospect, the USSR's relations with Cuba after 1964 illustrate tempered conservatism in dealing with a revolutionary state. The Soviets applied both economic and diplomatic pressure on Cuba as a means of bringing Castro more into consonance with their new orientations toward Latin America. Moscow tempered this pressure with selected words of praise. It pledged continued solidarity with Cuba in April 1968, honored the anniversary of "Che" Guevara's death in June, and extolled Soviet-Cuban economic cooperation in July. [Ref. 14, p. 659]

D. SOVIET-CUBAN REALIGNMENT

1. Castro Experiences Internal Difficulties

Throughout the 1960's Castro had remained adamant in his attitudes of an independent Cuba and the export of revolution as the means of changing government. By 1968 he found himself in the untenable position of having failed to achieve either goal. As a result of poor planning and organization by the Fidelistas, Castro faced severe economic and social strains. Partly as a result of a drought in eastern Cuba, the 1968 sugar harvest by mid-March was almost a million tons below the 1967 comparable harvest,

and far off the eight-million-ton goal set for the year. Moreover, a number of social problems--closely tied to economic difficulties--were plaguing Cuba. [Ref. 14 p. 663] The Russians were quick to point all this out and press for a more organized and efficient operation. The impact of Che Guevara's death in 1967 rounded out the failure issue. Although Castro had continued to advocate guerrilla warfare with promises of support, no guerrilla undertakings in Latin America had been successful.

Solid evidence of a Soviet-Cuban rapprochement developed after Havana declared its support of Moscow's August 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion policy. In addition to praising their "fraternal friendship," both countries demonstrated the new sense of accord in 1969 through formation of a Cuban-Soviet Friendship Association in April, a visit of seven Soviet warships to Havana to help commemorate the 26th of July, and a well-publicized one day of work in the cane fields by 650 Soviet technicians and diplomats in November. [Ref. 14 p. 661] Also in November, Defense Minister Grechko visited Havana amid much fanfare. As was written in the Summer 1971 issue of Orbis, there was much evidence of the new phase in Cuban-Soviet relations:

"...major speeches during 1969 relegated acknowledged problems between Moscow and Havana to the past."

"...a defector from Castro's intelligence network reported in July 1969 that Castro had signed an accord with Moscow in 1968 committing himself to a pro-Moscow line, in return for which the Soviet Union agreed not to diminish its economic support to Cuba and would supply 5,000 technicians to work in Cuba's faltering economy. If this report is accurate, it would help to explain the new phase."

"...certain party events in Cuba suggest a response to Moscow's renewed emphasis on orthodoxy and conservatism in its approach to revolutionary states. Castro and other members of the PCC's Central Committee, such as Armando Hart Devalos, began in 1969 to urge the necessity of strengthening the party and its mass organization at all levels. They explicitly referred, in some cases, to the Soviet experience as the example." /Ref. 14 p. 662-663/

In sum, Castro had moderated his tone, and more importantly, had ceased his attacks against both the Soviets and the orthodox parties. Whether the seeds of rivalry and discord between the Cubans and their Soviet mentors still remain below the surface, they will only be revealed through observation and analysis of past, current, and future attitudinal and behavioral expressions between the two countries. Meanwhile, Moscow can take some satisfaction in the fact, that while the New Left continues to fragment in Latin America, dissonances within the orthodox Communist movement have been largely muted and the Cubans are more or less in line. /Ref. 42 p. 1143/

2. The 1970 Sugar Harvest Failure

By 1970 the domestic situation had grown uneasy. Within the economic community there was worker apathy, shoddy

work, lack of discipline, low labor productivity and wide-spread disorganization. To bolster morale and rejuvenate the depressed economy an all-out drive for a 10 million ton sugar harvest in 1970 was launched. There was high risk of failure but the yield would be over \$650 million, under the 1964 Soviet-Cuban Trade Agreement and it would also provide Cuba with much needed foreign exchange earnings on the world market. This, too, was advantageous for Castro, for it would lessen the dependence of Cuba on the Soviets. Throwing everything into the effort Castro used the harvest as the "decisive test" to prove the functionality of his radical style of leadership and of Fidelismo itself.

Long before the harvest was in, it was apparent the goal would not be reached. The reasons were obvious; insufficient cane acreage, a lower than expected sugar cane yield and unexpected problems with the sugar mills were the main obstacles. As early as May 20, Castro had to acknowledge publicly that their goal would not be reached and reassigned an immediate goal of an 8.5 to 9.0 million ton harvest. Although the final outcome was a record 8,535 million tons, nearly double that of the previous year (4.459 million tons), it was a limited victory and a costly venture. It was extremely detrimental to Fidel Castro, for it was his first

major domestic political defeat. He had performed well but had been unable to deliver on his commitments. Publicly confessing his "responsibility" and "ignorance" in bringing on Cuba's economic difficulties, Castro opened the door for a Soviet thrust at the Fidelista regime for domestic, political and economic reforms. Ref. 18 p. 210-213

E. PRESENT SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS

During the 1970's there have still been some disagreements by the two countries, but they have remained low key. The Soviet bloc continues to provide extensive economic support to Cuba while the USSR continues to pledge military backing should the need arise. During the previously mentioned visit to Cuba, Soviet Communist Party Chief, Leonid Brezhnev lauded the Cuban Revolution as the inspiration for "all oppressed countries of the world," while adding that Communism was embarked on a quest for peace. "The Soviet weapons in the hands of Cubans are not for attacking anyone," he stated, "They serve the cause of peace and tranquility," Ref. 21, p. 4 The Brezhnev visit is considered as the turning point in the history of the Cuban Revolution for it trumpets almost total realignment of the Castro regime with Soviet policy. Castro has further expressed a readiness and desire to establish diplomatic relations with any country that has a foreign policy independent

from that of the U.S. The full import of the Brezhnev visit to Cuba is as yet unknown, but it is felt to be an application of pressure for Castro to seek a solution to the Cuban-U.S. impasse. [Ref. 21 p. 8]

F. CUBA IN THE FUTURE

The Castro regime will continue for some time to be a burr under the blanket, but Castro is mellowing as the economics of the world become more obvious to him. The Soviets are in no position other than to support, for they do not believe in deserting an ally once joined, and to desert Cuba would be to admit defeat for the first time in their ideological undertakings. The Soviets obviously would like to see a formation of Cuban-U.S. friendly relations, because, with the U.S. back in the picture they would be less responsible for Cuban survival. While the USSR does not intend to lose Cuba, they realize how expensive it is to them, since they are pouring \$600 million per year into Cuba and gaining little political, economic or military benefits from it; they have learned a lesson from that.

The history of Soviet-Cuban relations since the early 1960's also warns of the anti-Soviet knife edge that Latin American nationalism can develop. Moscow is well aware of this essential lesson and shows no enthusiasm for supporting

another Cuba, led by a volatile, charismatic, and often unpredictable leader. Personalismo, Machismo, and Caudillismo* can operate against the Soviets just as they have against the U.S. Similarly, sensitivity to intervention can be directed eastward while continuing to be aimed northward.

[Ref. 14 p. 669]

G. CONSIDERATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP

Since Chapter One addressed the dilemma which Castro presented to U.S. and Latin American Cuban policy, it is only appropriate to make several parallel, but tentative, observations relevant to Soviet policy in this area. It is important to understand the tentativeness of any proposed conclusions at this point since a major facet of this research was to contribute to our knowledge of this relationship, and thus aid us in determining future direction of Soviet policy in Latin America.

Cuba's insularity and location, some 6000 nautical miles from its major protector and provider are obvious. What is not so obvious is the fact that the island is indefensible, from the Kremlin's point of view. i.e., the U.S. and OAS can take a range of conventional military actions against Cuba, to which Moscow could not hope to

*Personalismo - importance of personalities
Machismo - male virility
Caudillismo - strong-man rule

respond successfully and locally at any conventional levels of conflict. In effect, Cuba represents one global commitment that the USSR cannot defend locally. [Ref. 56 p. 505]

The second factor in the Soviet dilemma is the U.S. and OAS policy toward the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This has evolved as a result of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Crisis, the Cienfuegos Confrontation, and the recurring endeavors of the Castro regime to spread militant revolution in Latin America.

[Ref. 56 p. 505]

From these events, three tenets of U.S. and OAS policy have evolved. The first is the economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba within the Western Hemisphere. Another tenet is the use of force to oppose any threat from Cuba or from outside the Western Hemisphere against any Latin American state. (Evidence of this was demonstrated during the 1965 Dominican crisis when the U.S. and the OAS dispatched troops to Santa Domingo.) The third tenet of U.S. and OAS policy relates to the ban on offensive weapons introduction into Cuba. [Ref. 56 p. 506]

In addition to geography and U.S. and OAS policy, the client nature of Cuba's economy bears on the Soviet dilemma. The island's dependent economy tends to restrict the regime's foreign alignments to one country--the USSR. In other words,

Cuba has very little capability to influence international events. [Ref. 56 p. 507] Castro can use the island as a base for propaganda efforts and can provide some limited support to Latin American insurgencies. However, it is difficult to see how any Communist regime in Cuba could survive, without continuous Soviet aid, for more than a few months under the embargo conditions imposed by the OAS.

Now that Cuba has become a virtual "satellite" of the Soviet Union, there are many who see this only as the first step in a Soviet conspiracy to make future probes throughout Latin America. The prevailing sentiment in some quarters seems to be that for a state to open diplomatic relations with Moscow is to take the first step toward Communism. It has been further suggested that this "thrusting out" on Moscow's part is so aggressive that it might cast doubts on the future of U.S.-Soviet detente policies. Author, Wayne Smith, in his article "Soviet Policy and Ideological Formulations for Latin America", draws more realistic conclusions (to me) which are at odds with these views. He believes that the primary Soviet objective is not to "communize" Latin America, but to undercut U.S. influence in the area. He sees Moscow's efforts to achieve this goal as being essentially cautious and opportunistic. The Soviets prudently seek to take advantage of unrest and growing anti-Americanism,

but they do not create these conditions. They have little capacity to do so. He goes on to say that Soviet efforts are not likely to play a significant role in determining the outcome of events in Latin America. The Soviet presence may at times become a complicating factor in U.S.-Latin American relations and occasionally even an irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations; but in both cases it is apt to remain something of a side issue. [Ref. 42 p. 1123] The central issue in the hemisphere, then, is and will be the future of U.S.-Latin American relations vice Soviet-Latin American relations.

III. NATURE OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM

On 12 November 1974 in Quito, Ecuador, hemispheric foreign ministers defeated an effort to lift the Organization of American States' 1964 economic and political sanctions against Cuba by a vote of 12 to 3, with six nations abstaining. The proposal had been sponsored by Venezuela, Costa Rico and Columbia.

Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay came to Quito committed to opposing repeal of the embargo. Nicaragua, Brazil and the United States announced early in the meeting that they would abstain. Cuba's supporters kept saying they were sure of victory, until Haiti and Guatemala announced they also would abstain because they felt Castro was still meddling in the domestic affairs of his neighbors.

The fact that such a meeting occurred can be said to represent a significant foreign policy positional change on the part of the OAS membership since 1964; but more importantly, its occurrence is a direct result of perceived changes of Havana's attitude and behavior by the leadership of the member countries.

Up to this point all previous discussion has been focused on the conditions and ramifications of rapprochement as it affected the U.S., the USSR, and the other Latin

American countries. However, the perceptions, attitudes and exhibited behavior of Cuba toward these other key actors has not been addressed. Has there in fact been a change of attitudes and behavior on the part of the Cuban leadership? The thrust of the remaining portion of this research was to determine if in fact, such a measurable change has occurred from 1970 to the present.

Before proceeding, it is appropriate to focus on how attitude and behavior change have traditionally been conceptualized and related. Attitudes have generally been regarded as either mental readiness or implicit predispositions which exert some general and consistent influence on a fairly large class of evaluative responses. These responses are usually directed toward some object, person, group or nation in this case. In addition, attitudes are seen as enduring predispositions, but ones which are learned rather than innate. Therefore, even though attitudes are not momentarily transient, they are susceptible to change. [Ref. 58 p. 6]

What are the crucial components of this conceptualization of attitudes, and how are these components relevant to any practical problem? Thinking of attitudes as underlying learned predispositions suggests that all the techniques which are known to increase or decrease learning should be applicable to producing change in attitudes.

For instance, rewards and punishments should be highly effective means of producing attitude change, and it should be possible to use them to predict the amount of generalized attitude change that will occur. In essence, all the techniques relevant to learning any materials should be relevant to learning and changing attitudes [Ref. 58 p. 7]

Merely defining attitudes as enduring, general, and learned tells us little about how to measure or change them. In fact, defining attitudes in this way only implies that they are states which exist inside an entity and which exert some control over its overt behavior. How they exert control is left ambiguous. Therefore, to solve these problems, attitudes have generally been divided into three components: affect, cognition, and behavior. The affective component consists of an evaluation of, liking of, or emotional response to some object, person or nation. The cognitive component has been conceptualized as the beliefs about, or factual knowledge of, the object, person, or nation. The behavioral component involves the overt behavior directed toward the object, person or nation. It should be remembered that the purpose of this research was not to determine by what means Cuba's attitudes towards other nations were formed, manipulated or changed, but it was to periodically measure such attitude alterations.

This three component conception provides us with ideas about how to measure them. The affective component could be measured by physiological responses or verbal statements of like and dislike, while the cognitive component might be measured by self-ratings or subjective ratings of beliefs or the amount of knowledge which an entity has about some topic. The behavioral component could be measured by direct observation of how an entity behaves in specific stimulus situations. [Ref. 58 p. 7-8]

Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that attitudes are generalized predispositions to behave in various ways. It follows from this conception that changes in these predispositions should be eventually followed by corresponding changes in behavior. Unfortunately, research relevant to this topic has indicated that such a conclusion is frequently false; changes in attitudes are not necessarily accompanied by changes in behavior. [Ref. 58 p. 85]

While the intent of this research problem was not to analyze those intervening variables that may cause such a phenomena to occur or not occur, it is important to be aware of their presence. Briefly they may be categorized as expected role sanctions and habits, capability and behavioral intentions to act in a specific manner, and expected consequences of a given behavior. In other words, given a stimulus-response

type situation, allowance for these factors must be made before any response can be anticipated or projected.

This research problem was to measure Cuba's attitudinal (affective, cognitive, behavioral) view of the world over the past four and one-half years to determine if such view has been significantly altered or changed; and, whether or not such change or lack thereof was subsequently verified or substantiated by its actual overt behavior with respect to the other world countries, esp. the U.S., USSR, and the other Latin American countries.

IV. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE

A. INTRODUCTION

At this point in the research my objective is to determine how Cuba envisions the other world countries in terms of their expressed view of those countries, and to compare and contrast these attitudinal views with their actual overt behavior over the same time frame.

All communications which emanate from Cuba, such as broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers and periodicals, were assumed to be products of their owner/operator, the Cuban government. It was further assumed that since this was the case, these communications accurately reflected/represented/inferred the values, attitudes, motives, intentions and concerns of that government. Technically stated, "the important aspects of communications are what is revealed by the lexical items present in it; words are assumed to 'represent' accurately the communicators' inner feelings, and through 'Content Analysis' of these communications, constant, though probabilistic, relationships between the content of communications and the underlying motives of the author can be measured."

[/Ref. 23, p. 32/

The source used for making this determination was a random sample of the Daily Report Contents for Cuba, of the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Latin America (FBIS). Data was collected from April 1970 through September 1974.

Through utilization of the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS), data relating to Cuba's real world behavior was compiled for the same time period. The source this data was extracted from the weekly journal, Latin America, and coded in accordance with current WEIS procedures.

In essence, then, the intent was to measure through Content Analysis, the attitudinal world view of the Cuban government in relation to foreign affairs, and to contrast and compare this data with Cuba's real world foreign affairs interactions (WEIS) over the same time frame.

B. CONTENT ANALYSIS

1. How it Works!

Content analysis is a multipurpose research method developed specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as the basis of inference. [Ref. 23 p. 2] This is but one of the numerous definitions of content analysis which could have been employed in introducing this basic research tool. Despite their diversity, definitions of content analysis reveal



broad agreement on the requirements of objectivity, system, and generality. Objectivity stipulates that each step in the research process must be carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules and procedures. Even the simplest and most mechanical forms of content analysis require the investigator to use his judgement in making decisions about his data. Objectivity implies that these decisions are guided by an explicit set of rules that minimize--although probably never quite eliminate--the possibility that the findings reflect the analyst's subjective predispositions rather than the content of the documents under analysis. Systematic means the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently applied rules. This requirement clearly eliminates analysis in which only materials supporting the investigator's hypothesis are admitted as evidence. It also implies that categories are defined in a manner which permit them to be used according to consistently applied rules. Generality requires that the findings must have theoretical relevance. Purely descriptive information about content, unrelated to other attributes of documents or to the characteristics of the sender or recipient of the message, is of little value. [Ref. 23 p. 37] Stated somewhat differently, "a datum about a

communication content is meaningless until it is related to at least one other datum." /Ref. 23 p. 5/ The link between these is represented by some form of theory. Thus all content analysis is concerned with comparison, the type of comparison being dictated by the investigator's theory. At this point we can now present a more refined definition of content analysis which will serve as a basis for this research project. Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages.

All communication is composed of six basic elements: a source or sender, an encoding process which results in a message, a channel of transmission, a detector or recipient of the message, and a decoding process. /Ref. 23 p. 24/

The investigator may analyze messages to make inferences about the characteristics of text, the causes or antecedents of messages, or the effects of communication. Content analysis is used most frequently to describe the attributes of messages or "what" question, without reference to either intentions (encoding process) of the sender or the effect of the message upon those to whom it is directed (decoding process). Much of the research has addressed itself to some variety of the "what?" question, testing hypothesis about such matters as focus of attention, trends in communication, or cross-media difference. /Ref. 23 p. 28/

The analyst may compare documents derived from a single source in several ways. One application of this method is the comparison of messages over time, from which the analyst may draw inferences about secular trends. This is one of the most frequently used forms of content analysis. The investigator may also compare messages from a single source in differing situations. This is applicable for determining the effect of changed circumstances on specified characteristics of communications. Both of these approaches are directly applicable to the present research and can be graphically illustrated as follows:



Another major classification of studies is that in which the text is analyzed in order to make inferences about the causes or antecedents of the message. In other words, what are the values, attitudes, motives, intentions, or concerns of the communicator that can be inferred from the message. It was in these contexts that Content Analysis was of primary interest to the current research project.

2. Sampling and Reliability

The goal of content analysis research is to present a systematic and objective description of the attributes of communication. These data may be used to make inferences about communicators or audiences. But whatever the specific purpose of the study, there are certain problems which the content analyst shares with all persons conducting systematic inquiry. What is the universe of communication to be described, and what sample is to be drawn therefrom? Do repeated measures with the same categories on a set of documents yield stable and consistent results? That is, can the study be replicated? Do the categories actually index the variables they are intended to measure? Careful attention to these questions was an integral part of this research project in order to meet meaningful standards of systematic investigation.

3. Sampling

The sampling procedure was as follows: A random sample of two issues per month of the forementioned content analysis source document, U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Latin America (FBIS), were selected over the period from April 1970 through September 1974. It should be noted that this random selection was remotely accomplished without any direct communication or liaison between the researcher and the sampler. The result of this was a sample of 108 days of FBIS reports for the time frame of the research.

4. Reliability

If research is to satisfy the requirements of objectivity, measures and procedures must be reliable; i.e., repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results. To meet these requirements the Content Analysis Coding Rules at the end of this subsection were constructed and adhered to.

All coding was accomplished by the primary researcher without necessity for outside coders. Nevertheless, in order to comply with the above reliability requirements, all broadcast were coded three times at different time intervals. Only minor discontinuities, discrepancies and inconsistencies were found to exist between the three different occasions. These were all remedied and accounted for to the satisfaction of the researcher, without any adverse effect on the final results.

Although the researcher was the only coder in this instance, it was still felt that the requirements of individual reliability should be met. The purpose of such a test is to reflect the extent of agreement between coders. This was accomplished through administering an informal test to the research advisor, and to another impartial coder. Both were presented with a list of coding rules and a random sample of broadcasts. Only minor discontinuities and inconsistencies between these two coders and the researcher were found to exist. These were primarily attributable to the outside coders' non-familiarity with the research material and procedures. It was felt that should their coding services be required under actual circumstances, these minor discrepancies could be ameliorated with proper briefing, and thorough understanding, familiarization, and usage of the following Coding Rules.

5. Coding Procedures

The reported utterance or deed in some sense must "cross" a national boundary. Ordinarily, the report will include a recipient or "target" of the reported utterance. If the broadcast reports upon or quotes individual's statements about other countries, such individuals must be high level official Cuban government and executive sources or that of an executive agency of that government. (i.e., Ministry of

Education, Armed Forces, Interior, etc.) Any reported statements made by visiting foreign dignitaries and other persons about various countries will be ignored. Also, all "non-international" and domestic reports will be coded separately under Special Categories to be explained later.

6. Coding Rules

COUNTRY AND WORLD ORGANIZATION APPROACH: The countries of the world have been grouped into 14 distinct categories and three world recognized organizations. They consist of and are defined on the following extract from the coding sheet.

1. USSR

USSR BLOC SUPPORTERS	BULGARIA E. GERMANY POLAND	HUNGARY INDIA COMECON	CEMA MONGOLIA
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2.

BLOC DEVIANTS	RUMANIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA YUGOSLAVIA
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3.

MID-EAST SOVIET SYMPATHIZERS	LIBYA EGYPT	SYRIA
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4.

5. U.S.

NATO, U.S. ALLIES	UNIT. KING. PORTUGAL TURKEY BELGIUM	DENMARK NETHER. LUXEM. GREECE	ITALY NORWAY W. GERM. ISRAEL	LESS U.S. CAN. FRANCE
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6.

U.S. PACIFIC/ASIAN ALLIES	SVN. P.I.	CAMBODIA TAIWAN	THAILAND LAOS
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7.

8. PRC

9.	NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC.	AUSTRALIA N.Z.	MALAYSIA BURMA	INDONESIA
10.	NON-ALIGN. AFRICA			
11.	NON-ALIGN. EUROPEAN	SWEDEN FINLAND	SWITZERLAND SPAIN	AUSTRIA IRELAND
12.	MID-EAST	LEBANON SAUDI ARABIA	IRAN	JORDAN IRAQ
13.	LATIN AMERICA			
14.	OUTLIERS	CANADA	FRANCE	JAPAN
15.	COMMUNIST ASIA	N. VIETNAM N. KOREA		CAMBODIAN COMM. LAOTIAN COMM.
16.	OAS ORGANIZATION			
17.	U.N. ORGANIZATION			

FUNCTIONAL TARGET AREAS OF INTEREST: Since it is likely that Cuba's broadcast area of interest may be inconsistent, (i.e., they may verbally attack a country, while at the same time be seeking economic aid from the same country) it is necessary to be more specific by listing three Functional Target Areas of Interest for each country--military, (scientific, cultural, economic) S-C-E, and political.

MILITARY--The theme must directly state a reference to the military establishment, forces, hardware, employments, deployments, policies, etc. of a specified country.

EXAMPLE: "The U.S. imperialists further exhibited their aggressive tendencies by deploying an aircraft carrier to patrol in Cuban waters."

SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC (S-C-E)--The theme must directly refer to scientific, cultural or economic events related to the specified nations. Economic events are defined as follows:

- a) economic policies, either internal or external,
- b) trade relations with other nations,
- c) nature of economic system (not meant to include "imperialist" or "communist")

EXAMPLE: "Israeli aggressors are heavily dependent on the U.S. capitalists for a large portion of their oil supply". "The USSR has agreed to buy all

the sugar that Cuba can produce in the next year."

POLITICAL--The theme must directly relate to political concepts of a specified nation or organization. Broadcasts relating to the following are to be included:

- a) international agreements or political alignments,
- b) participation in the political affairs of another nation,
- c) political events within the nation,
- d) foreign policy, not to include military or economic concepts.

EXAMPLE: "New Soviet Ambassador presents credentials to President Dorticos."

"The unequal representation that North and South Korea have in the U.N. is the direct responsibility of the imperialist U.S. Aggressors."

AREA OF INTEREST EVALUATION: Cuba's broadcasts relating to various target areas of interest for the countries and organizations under study will be ranked as favorable, neutral, or unfavorable.

UNFAVORABLE--The theme must contain adjectives or wording of a negative nature, directed at the specified country or organization, in one or more of the three Functional Target Areas of Interest. The theme must carry a negative comment at face value.

EXAMPLE: "Castro issued a communique condemning U.S. imperialist aggression in Indochina and calling on the peoples of the world to strengthen their fighting solidarity with the peoples of that peninsula."

NEUTRAL--The theme must contain a reference to one or more of the three Functional Target Areas of Interest for a country or organization, but there must be no direct comment either in praise or in opposition to the category.

EXAMPLE: "The British and the U.S. imperialists are participating in ever closing economic relations."

FAVORABLE--The theme must include direct reference to agreement of one or more of the Functional Target Areas of Interest for a specified country or organization. The theme must carry at face value, a positive comment on support of the category.

EXAMPLE: "The Arab oil producing nations are justified in carrying on the oil war with their imperialist enemies."

7. Unit of Analysis

The theme will be the unit of analysis. Each broadcast can contain only three different themes for each category. For instance, a broadcast may contain either a favorable, or unfavorable, or neutral political theme; and, either a favorable, or unfavorable, or neutral scientific, cultural, economic (S-C-E) theme; and, either a favorable, or unfavorable, or neutral military theme. If a broadcast contains favorable, unfavorable and neutral themes for any of the Functional Target Areas of Interest in a category, the coder must decide on the one measurement of interest which is most predominant.

8. Special Categories

Categories 18 through 25 will be referred to as special categories of interest. Only the number of broadcasts which meet the special category criteria (to be defined later) will be logged in the appropriate space. It should be noted that broadcasts which meet the criteria for an entry in category 1 through 17 may also contain references to categories 18 through 25, and may thus be concurrently logged. The following coding sheet excerpt shows the special categories, and the modifiers thereof.

<u>NUMBER OF BRDCST.</u>	<u>ADVERSE</u>	<u>FAVORABLE</u>	<u>NEUTRAL</u>
18. USSR DEPENDENCE _____			
19. RENEWED U.S.REL. _____			
20. CUBA AS INSTR. USSR _____			
21. CHILE BRDCST. _____			
22. REVOL. IN L.A. _____	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL
23. CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/POLIT/EDUC/ RELIG. _____	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL
24. NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE _____	PROMOTES 2 NAT.CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION	NO. FOR. BROADCAST
25. SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES _____			NO. DOM. BROADCAST

SPECIAL CATEGORY DEFINITIONS: USSR DEPENDENCE--Broadcast theme must make specific reference to present, past, or future dependence of Cuba on the USSR. Themes will be logged as adverse, favorable or neutral.

EXAMPLE: "The only way the Cuban economy can free itself from our generous Soviet comrades is through the toil of its citizens." NEUTRAL

RENEWED U.S. RELATIONS--Broadcast theme must make specific reference to Cuban views on renewed political and economic relations with the United States. Themes will be logged as adverse, favorable or neutral.

EXAMPLE: "Nothing that the Yankee aggressor would ever do could influence free Cuba to assume its previous slavlike status to that country."

ADVERSE

CUBA AS INSTRUMENT OF USSR--Only broadcasts which refer to Cuba's being used as a military, political or economic extension of Soviet influence in the western hemisphere, will be logged in this category.

EXAMPLE: "The Soviet government and people will always be able to depend on the Cuban people to project and defend the ideals and principles of Soviet Communism in Latin America." FAVORABLE

CHILE BROADCAST--Since there was an apparent change in

alliance of this country during the research period, it was necessarily treated as an outlier of the Latin American countries. Viewing such a conclusion, it could be treated as an ally of the USSR up to September 1973, thereafter, as a typical Latin American country.

EXAMPLE: "The ideals expounded by the Allende government represent those of a free people in a free country." FAVORABLE

REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA--All broadcast themes which refer to revolutionary activities in other Latin American countries will be logged in this category. Themes will be logged as promotes, opposes or neutral.

EXAMPLE: "Party leader Castro has again offered to supply arms and expertise to any Latin American country that chooses to overthrow the Facist leaders and restore the reigns of leadership to its rightful owner, the people."

PROMOTES

CUBA, DOMESTIC, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, EDUCATION, MILITARY

AND RELIGION--A large number of broadcast themes will confine themselves to these topics without any foreign target country being involved, i.e., broadcasts relating to internal issues will be logged here. Themes will be logged as self-critical, favorable/praising or neutral.

EXAMPLE: "Premier Castro announced today that the total tonnage figure for this year's sugar harvest was being reduced to 8 million tons." SELF

CRITICISM

DOMESTIC BROADCAST--Total number of broadcasts in reporting period which meet criteria of category 23 above, and thus have no target country.

FOREIGN BROADCAST--Total number of broadcasts in reporting period which do not meet criteria of category 23 above, and thus do refer to a target country/countries.

NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTES--Broadcast theme must refer to activities and actions that are pertinent to the North/South disputes in Korea and Vietnam. Themes will be logged as promotes two-nation concept or reunification of two countries.

SUPPORT FOR OTHER WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES--Broadcast must make reference to the activities and actions of other world Communist activities.

EXAMPLE: "Officials of the Communist Party of the USA received a tumultuous welcome today upon the arrival at Jose Marti airport."

NOTE: THE COMPLETE CODING SHEET CAN BE SEEN IN APPENDIX B.

C. WORLD EVENT INTERACTION SURVEY

1. How it Works!

"The world interaction survey is a program of research

to develop the ability to describe, trace, compare, explain and predict, under theoretical discipline, a particular range of international behavior by means of indicator data."

[/Ref. 57 p. 3/] It provides for building indicators of behavioral regularities, trends, and changes in the direction or pattern of activity in the complex flow of interaction. The research is expected to contribute findings that shed light on external performance traits and tendencies of countries, and on the configurations of actions and responses in the political exchanges between countries.

The objective is to "gather reported acts committed crossnationally by the upper level of officialdom of national regimes in order to facilitate analyses of structures and processes of action and response at the 'control level' of international politics." [/Ref. 57 p. 1/]

Event/interaction is a term that has been defined technically to specify the types of acts that occur at that level. All kinds of problems, issues, contests, conflicts, adjustments, and subjects rising in international political relations are included as long as they relate to specific and discrete acts that have been committed. Event/interaction is conceived overall to be a complex stream of events moving in historical time sequence. [/Ref. 57 p. 2/]

2. Exclusions

It is to be noted especially that domestic events, reports of purposes and motivations of actors, ecological factors, and various intra-system processes and effects were excluded from the data collection. Also excluded were editorial opinions, interpretative reports, speculations on future international affairs, and generalized reports on series of events. The reason for these exclusions is to allow the acquisition of a relatively "pure" body of information that pertains closely to what nations do as they act and respond in international political situations. A record of performance and of behavior in the more exact sense is sought. [Ref. 57 p. 2]

In the current research project, all event/interactions involving Cuba and some other actor/country were coded. The source of the data was all the weekly issues of the journal, Latin America, from April 1970 through September 1974. There was a total of 338 interactions involving Cuba recorded during this time frame of which 293 could be considered favorable and 45 were coded as adverse.

The originator or initiator of an act is designated by code number according to "nation" or "actor". Thus the U.S. has the identifying number 002. The Soviet Union is 365; Cuba is 040, etc. These number codes apply, of course, to

nations in both the originator and recipient categories. Thus, 040 "acts to" 002 means the Cuba "acts to" the U.S.

The heart of the WEIS classification system is in the designations of different types of "acting to." The classification scheme identifies 63 types of acts and, thus, provides 63 different coding possibilities, only one of which would be appropriate to substitute for "acts to" in the example given above. The case might have been 040 protests to the U.S.

Since 63 different categories cannot be kept in mind by anyone who is converting the action words to their numerical equivalents, an ordering of the 63 codes in groups was designed to assist in the memory. [Ref. 57 p. 9-10]

1. Twenty-two cue-words organize the 63 types. These cue-words are not to be taken to be exact common-language meanings. They are technical mnemonic devices only. They are listed below.
2. A rough ordering of the 22 cue-words is provided so that the first ten have to do with more peaceful, benign, cooperative, non-aggressive types of events while the second group consists of more belligerent, aggressive, conflict-related events. No theoretical significance underlies this arrangement and no scaling techniques are involved.

The ordering is a convenience to assist coders in remembering the system. The 22 reminders or cue-words, in the two groupings, are:

yield	reject
comment	accuse
consult	protest
approve	deny
promise	demand
grant	warn
reward	threaten
agree	demonstrate
request	reduce relationship
propose	expel
	seize
	force

Under each heading (i.e., yield) are additional cue-words which refer directly to the 63 category system. The three digit number equivalents are given here. For example YIELD contains:

- 011 Surrender; yield to order; submit to arrest
- 012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate
- 013 Admit wrongdoing; retract statement


The entire list of 63 categories, organized as indicated above, giving the word and number equivalents is listed in Appendix A.

D. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL

The following illustration provides graphic representation of the research methodology used in this research problem.

Source A:
 Time (t_1) 1970
 Situation (s_1) 1970

Source A:
 Time (t_2) 1974
 Situation (s_2) 1974



V. CATEGORICAL SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

A. INTRODUCTION

The results of the research will be presented in the following manner. This chapter will concentrate on the numerical findings (both attitudinal and behavioral) from a categorical perspective. In other words, how do the major categories fluctuate over the research period? The chapter to follow (Chapter VI Analysis of Findings) will blend together and consider all categories and their inter-relationships on a period-by-period basis. Viewed from a simplified perspective, this chapter will disclose the factual numerical results while the following chapter will provide the macro-analysis, significance, and meaning of those results.

As previously indicated, a total of 108 days of Latin America FBIS publications were drawn as a sample. This sample encompassed 542 broadcast pages, and included therein were 963 separate broadcasts. Of this number 585 were designated as foreign broadcasts, that is, with a country other than Cuba as the "target country", while 378 were considered as domestic broadcasts and pertained only to internal matters within Cuba.

WEIS data comprised a total of 338 separate interactions

involving Cuba and at least one other country. Of this number 292 were evaluated as favorable to the target country while 46 were considered as unfavorable interactions.

The research period, consisting of eighteen total quarters or 54 months, was equally subdivided into 9 separate periods of two quarters each. They are designated as follows, and will be referred to as such throughout the remainder of this research.

<u>Period 1</u>	<u>Period 2</u>	<u>Period 3</u>	<u>Period 4</u>	<u>Period 5</u>
March 70 thru September 70	October 70 thru March 71	April 71 thru September 71	October 71 thru March 72	April 72 thru September 72
<u>Period 6</u>	<u>Period 7</u>	<u>Period 8</u>	<u>Period 9</u>	
October 72 thru March 73	April 73 thru September 73	October 73 thru March 74	April 74 thru September 74	

B. CONTENT ANALYSIS

1. General

Figure 1 shows a sample matrix used to code the broadcasts. One of these was completed for each of the nine reporting periods and the results of this coding are listed in Appendix B.

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOM., CULT., SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	SEE
U.S.	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	CODING
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	RULES
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	FOR
PRC	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	CATEGORY
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	DEFINITION
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
MID-EAST	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
OUTLIERS	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	1= 2= 3=	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR				
CHILE BROADCASTS				
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.				
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG				
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE				NO. FOR. BRDCST.
	NO. OF BROADCAST			
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES				NO. DOM. BRDCST.
FIGURE 1. CONTENT ANALYSIS CODING SHEET				

Figure 2 reflects a tally of each country and organizational category by Area of Interest Evaluation, (favorable, unfavorable, neutral). Any significance to be attached to the Functional Target Areas of Interest, (political, scientific-cultural-economic, and military) will be addressed in the following chapter, Analysis of Findings.

Graphic representation will reflect the following five categories and/or combination of categories which were of primary interest in the research. They are the USSR, USSR plus allies, U.S., U.S. plus allies, and Latin America.

Each country category of the coding sheet will now be briefly, but individually, addressed.

2. USSR

Figure 3 graphically presents Cuba's attitudinal disposition toward the USSR, using the Content Analysis technique. There were a total of 80 themes, 41 of which were favorable and 31 were neutral. There were no unfavorable themes relating to the USSR. While the graph is self-explanatory it is interesting to note the similarities between Periods 1-2, 5-6, 8-9. In each of these we can see an increase in neutral themes as the favorable themes sharply decrease. The opposite of this is true in Period 2-3 where we have a decrease in neutral themes as the favorable themes sharply decrease. In all other cases the neutral themes

CATEGORY	Period 1			Period 2			Period 3			Period 4			Period 5			Period 6			Period 7			Period 8			Period 9			Totals	
	F U N			F U N			F U N			F U N			F U N			F U N			F U N			F U N			F U N				
	F	U	N	F	U	N	F	U	N	F	U	N	F	U	N	F	U	N	F	U	N	F	U	N	F	U	N		
USSR	9	0	1	1	0	5	4	0	2	10	0	5	7	0	5	6	0	7	2	0	1	8	0	2	3	0	3	81	
USSR ALLIES	4	0	11	7	0	3	9	0	0	24	0	2	8	0	6	17	0	9	21	0	9	10	0	0	9	0	2	152	
U.S.	0	37	2	0	24	4	0	34	5	0	33	8	0	21	6	0	17	6	0	12	5	0	5	3	0	15	8	246	
U.S. ALLIES	1	7	2	1	6	3	0	1	2	0	4	2	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	1	41	
PRC	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	1	1	0	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	14	
NON-ALIGN. ASIAN/PAC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	1	1	0	2	1	0	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	26	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	13	
MID-EAST	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
LATIN AMERICA	3	9	1	0	4	2	2	8	1	2	1	4	7	4	4	13	3	3	7	4	8	9	0	4	12	2	4	121	
OUTLIERS	2	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	3	23	
COMM. ASIA	10	0	1	6	0	1	7	0	1	10	0	0	12	0	1	4	0	1	4	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	1	66	
OAS	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	5	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	23	
U.S.	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	1	0	1	14	
																												821	
	F	SC	N	F	SC	N	F	SC	N	F	SC	N	F	SC	N	F	SC	N	F	SC	N	F	SC	N	F	SC	N		
CUBAN DOMESTIC	24	8	3	13	18	21	22	7	18	60	14	22	31	2	8	22	3	6	15	2	2	18	1	5	21	0	12	378	

FIGURE 2. TALLY OF AREA OF INTEREST
EVALUATION OF CONTENT ANALYSIS
BY COUNTRY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORIES




FIGURE 3. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USSR.

either follow the favorable theme line or remain constant between periods. The significance of this phenomena will be explored in the next chapter.

3. USSR Plus Allies

Figure 4 portrays Cuba's attitudes towards the USSR plus allies. In addition to the previously given USSR theme breakdown, the Allies constituted an additional 152 themes 110 of which were favorable and 42 were neutral. Between Periods 2-3 favorable themes were increasing while neutrals were decreasing, while the opposite situation exists between Periods 4-5, and 8-9. In all other periods, the trend direction was the same for both themes.

4. U.S.

Figure 5 shows the breakdown of the 246 themes which represent Cuba's attitudinal view toward the U.S. Forty-seven of these were neutral while 199 were unfavorable. No favorable themes were recorded for the U.S. The only trend direction deviations occur in Periods 1-2, and 3-4, where neutral themes were increasing as unfavorable themes were decreasing. In all other periods, the trend direction was the same for both themes.




FIGURE 4. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USSR PLUS ALLIES




FIGURE 5. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S.

5. U.S. Plus Allies

Figure 6 shows the breakdown for how Cuba views the U.S. Plus Allies. In addition to the previously noted U.S. themes, 41 additional ones were recorded for the allies, 15 of which were neutral, 23 were unfavorable and 3 were favorable. The only trend direction deviations not previously mentioned occurred in Period 3-4, where unfavorable themes increase as neutral themes increase. Generally speaking, favorable themes only occurred when unfavorable themes had reached a low point and neutral themes had reached a high point for the indicated reference period.

6. PRC

Fourteen themes were recorded which reflected Cuba's view of the Peoples Republic of China. Seven of them were favorable and seven were neutral. With the exception of one neutral theme in Period 9, all previous themes were recorded before Period 6.

7. Non-Aligned Asian/Pacific

There were no themes recorded in this category.

8. Non-Aligned Africa

There were a total of 26 themes which represented Cuba's attitude toward this category. Fourteen were favorable, 1 was unfavorable, and 11 were neutral.




FIGURE 6. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S. PLUS ALLIES

9. Non-Aligned European

Thirteen themes were recorded which reflected Cuba's view toward this category. Eight of them were favorable and 5 were neutral. The majority of the neutral themes appeared in Period 9.

10. Mid-East

There was only one theme relating to Cuba's attitudes towards the non-aligned Middle-East countries. It was favorable and was recorded in Period 8.

11. Latin America

Figure 7 shows the theme breakdown for Cuba's attitudinal view of the Latin American countries. A total of 121 themes were recorded, 55 of which were favorable, 35 unfavorable and 31 neutral. Several obvious trends stand out when viewing this graph. There has been a general downward trend in unfavorable themes throughout the period, and a general upward trend in favorable and neutral themes throughout the period. With the exception of Periods 5-6, 6-7, and 7-8, the unfavorable trend direction always follows the favorable trend, and the neutral trend direction is always opposite that of the favorable trend direction. Also, the neutral trend direction is opposite to the unfavorable direction up to Period 5-6 where it begins to follow the unfavorable line.




FIGURE 7. ATTITUDES TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

12. Outliers

A total of 23 themes were recorded to reflect Cuba's views toward France, Canada and Japan. Eight of them were favorable and 15 were neutral.

13. Communist Asia

The sixty-six themes recorded in this category represented Cuba's view toward the countries of Communist Asia. Sixty were favorable and 6 were neutral. The peak of the favorable themes was reached in Period 5, with a general downward slope since that time.

14. OAS Organization

Twenty-three themes were recorded in this category to reflect Cuba's toward this organization. Seventeen were unfavorable and 6 were neutral. The peak of the unfavorable themes was reached in Period 3.

15. U.N. Organization

The fourteen themes recorded in this category show how Cuba viewed this organization. Nine of them were neutral and 5 were favorable. No favorable themes were recorded until Period 6.

16. Special Categories--Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

Of the 963 broadcasts, 585 were designated as foreign and placed in the categories indicated above, while 378 were concerned exclusively with internal domestic

matters relating to political, military, education and religious interests. A graph of the number of Foreign/Domestic broadcasts can be seen in Figure 8.

The number of Foreign broadcasts reached a low in Period 2 which would not be equaled until Period 8. Between that time, there was a rise in Periods 2-3, 3-4, and 5-6, and a decline in Periods 4-5, 6-7 and 7-8. The sharp rise in Period 8-9 was evidently attributable to the aftermath of the Chilean coup.

The Domestic broadcasts followed an opposite trend to Foreign in Periods 1-2 and 2-3. In Period 4 both of them hit an all-time high which would not again be exceeded during the course of the research, with Domestic broadcasts exceeding that of Foreign. Subsequently, Domestic broadcast fell off rapidly through Period 7 at which time it reached its all-time low. Thereafter, it began to rise again and continued to do so through the end of the research period.

With respect to Domestic broadcast alone, (Figure 9) the number of favorable broadcast duplicated the Foreign broadcast trend through Period 5, thereafter duplicating the Domestic broadcast trend. With the exception of the high peak in Period 4, the number and trend of the neutral broadcast duplicated that of the domestic broadcast




FIGURE 8. FOREIGN/DOMESTIC BROADCASTS




FIGURE 9. DOMESTIC BROADCASTS

throughout the research period. Self-critical broadcasts followed a similar trend through the first five periods, peaking in Periods 2 and 4, thereafter receding rapidly to a low point for the duration of the research period, and finally reaching zero in Period 9.

The exact period-by-period numbers can be seen along with the other results of Special Categories in Appendix B. However, further comment on these categories will be reserved until Chapter VI, Analysis of Findings.

C. WORLD EVENT INTERACTION SURVEY (WEIS)

1. General

The results of the WEIS data for all periods can be seen in Figure 10. All interactions were either categorized as favorable or unfavorable in accordance with the standard WEIS category criteria. I.e., 01X thru 10X = favorable; 11X thru 22X = unfavorable. The only exception to this was category 022-Comment on Situation-Pessimistic, which was considered unfavorable for the purposes of this research.

Again, graphic representation will depict the five categories and/or combination of categories which were of primary interest in the research. They are the same as those graphically illustrated in the previous Content Analysis subsection.

PERIOD	F A V O R A B L E																		U N F A V O R A B L E									Totals									
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		
USSR	5	1	1	1	6	6	2	9	4																										36		
USSR BLOC SUPPORTERS								2																												2	
BLOC DEVIANTS			1				4	2																											7		
MID-EAST SOV. SYMPH.								1																												1	
U.S.	1	1	1	1		5	1	4	18	2	1	2		1	2	2	4	4																49			
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	2	1							5			1																							11		
U.S. PACIFIC/ASIAN AL																																					
PRC																																					
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC.			2																																	2	
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA									5																											5	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPEAN					1			2	3			1																							7		
MID-EAST																																					
LATIN AMERICA	6	6	6	14	14	34	32	23	49		2	3		2	1	2	2	6																	202		
OUTLIERS		1			2	2		2			1	1																							10		
COMMUNIST ASIA																																					
OAS ORGANIZATION						1	1		2		1																								6		
U.N. ORGANIZATION																																				338	

FIGURE 10. WEIS RESULTS

All country and organization categories which had interactions with Cuba during the period of the research, will now be briefly, but individually addressed. Here again, ramifications, inferences and significance etc. of trends will be deferred until the following chapter.

Before proceeding, it should again be noted that WEIS data included only a total of 338 separate interactions involving Cuba and at least one other country. Of this number, 292 were evaluated as favorable to the target country while 46 were considered as unfavorable interactions. While it would be desirable to have a larger number of interactions to more accurately represent behavior, this current research should be viewed as only the initial effort to trace a country's behavior, with the emphasis on testing a new methodology rather than meeting numerical criteria.

2. USSR

Favorable = 35 Unfavorable = 1

A sharp downward trend in favorable interactions as indicated in Figure 11 can be seen in Period 1-2, followed by a leveling off from Periods 2-4. A peak is reached between Period 5-6, again falling off in Period 7 and rising and falling in Period 7-8 and 8-9 respectively. There was only one unfavorable interaction between Cuba and the USSR during the span of the research.




FIGURE 11. BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE USSR

3. USSR Plus Allies

Favorable = 44 Unfavorable = 1

This category is depicted in Figure 12. Generally, a similar situation existed as mentioned in the previous category, with the following exceptions. A short-lived peak in favorable interactions occurred in Period 3; and no downward trend occurred between Period 6 and 7.

4. U.S.

Favorable = 31 Unfavorable = 18

Figure 13 shows that very few favorable interactions occurred between Cuba and the U.S. up to Period 5. This was followed by an upward slope in Period 5-6 and downward during Period 6-7. From that time, a sharp upward trend in favorable interactions existed between the two countries. Low points of unfavorable interactions occurred in Periods 2 and 4. Highpoints occurred in Period 1 and 3, with a gentle upward slope beginning in Period 4 thru 6, leveling off from 6 to 7, climbing from 7 to 8 and again leveling off at a surprising all-time high.

5. U.S. Plus Allies

Favorable = 39 Unfavorable = 21

As depicted in Figure 14, we see a steady decline in favorable interactions occurring in this category from Period 1 thru 4. From that point, a parallel situation




FIGURE 12. BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE USSR PLUS ALLIES




FIGURE 13. BEHAVIOR TOWARDS THE U.S.




FIGURE 14. BEHAVIOR TOWARDS THE U.S. PLUS ALLIES

exists between this category and the previous one (U.S.). Also, the trend direction of the unfavorable interactions duplicate that of the previous category, (U.S.) with only minor deviation in intensity.

6. Non-Aligned Asia/Pacific

Favorable = 2 Unfavorable = 0

Only two interactions were recorded in this category. Both were favorable and occurred in Period 3.

7. Non-Aligned Africa

Favorable = 5 Unfavorable = 0

Only five interactions were recorded in this category. All were favorable and occurred in Period 9.

8. Non-Aligned European

Favorable = 6 Unfavorable = 1

All but one of the favorable interactions occurred in the latter two periods, while the only unfavorable interaction occurred in the third period.

9. Latin America

Favorable = 184 Unfavorable = 18

Figure 15 depicts this category. As indicated, the largest volume of interactions did occur in this category. Favorable interactions either increased or remained constant up to Period 6, at which time a decline appeared thru Period 8, then again followed by an increase. Since only 18




FIGURE 15. BEHAVIOR TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

unfavorable interactions were recorded in this category no significant trends can be detected other than a notable increase appearing between Period 8 and 9.

10. Outliers

Favorable = 7 Unfavorable = 3

Most favorable interactions occurred in the latter periods while the 3 unfavorable interactions were generally recorded in the earlier periods.

11. OAS Organization

Favorable = 4 Unfavorable = 2

As indicated, all favorable interactions occurred within the last four periods of the research period.

VI. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

This chapter contains a period-by-period analysis of the ramifications, inferences, and interrelationships of the various periods and category findings which resulted from Content Analysis and WEIS data.

A. PERIOD 1 (MAR. 1970-SEPT. 1970)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

It was during this period that the sugar harvest failure was actually becoming history. The number of Domestic broadcasts were at a low which would not be seen for the next two years, while the number of Foreign broadcasts were nearly two times that of Domestic. As with every other period studied in this research except Period 2, the current period contained a proportionately larger number of favorable Domestic broadcasts compared to neutral and self-critical ones. Again, the low number of neutral and self-critical broadcasts would not be seen for another two years. Looking ahead, if we unequivocally stated that Cuba became more critical over its domestic performance in the next two and one-half years, we would only be partially correct since we shall see that after Period 2, the number of favorable Domestic broadcasts also rose sharply.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

During this period, Cuba expressed a higher degree of unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S., its allies and the Latin American countries than any other period under study. The adverse attitudes expressed by Cuba were spread across the Functional Target Areas of Interest spectrum with the number of political and militarily related comments predominating over that of scientific-cultural-economic (S-C-E) expressions.

Cuba's unfavorable behavioral response to the U.S. was also at a high that would not be exceeded until Period 8. Regardless of this adverse behavioral disposition towards the U.S. alone, both favorable and unfavorable behavioral interactions toward the U.S. and its allies were comparatively high during the period.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

A close attitudinal and behavioral situation existed between Cuba and the USSR and its allies which would not be exceeded until Period 4 for attitudes, and Period 5 for behavior. Most of the favorable attitudinal support was for the USSR and spread fairly evenly across the Functional Target Area of Interest spectrum. The neutral expressions were predominantly related to S-C-E interest in the Bloc Supporters and Bloc Deviants. Compared to

other periods, there was also a significant amount of neutral interest expressed towards the Mid-East Sympathizer countries during this period.

4. Latin America

As stated previously, attitudinal expressions were high towards Latin America while favorable and unfavorable behavioral responses were at an all-time low during the period which would never be duplicated again during the research span. Nearly all of the expressed attitudes were of a political nature.

5. Outliers, Non-Aligned Africa and Communist Asia

Some favorable to neutral support, of an S-C-E nature, was expressed towards the Outlier countries and the countries which make up the Non-Aligned Africa category.

A relatively large number of favorable attitudinal expressions were made toward the countries of Communist Asia all across the Functional Target Area of Interest spectrum; however, no behavioral response was recorded.

6. OAS and UN

Expressions toward the OAS were expectedly adverse and of a political nature, while that towards the U.N. was neutral.

7. Special Categories

In reference to Special Categories, favorable

responses were made concerning Cuba's dependence upon the USSR and its role as an instrument of the USSR's policy. A favorable expression was made toward Chile, in addition to comments in support of promoting revolution in Latin America. There were four broadcasts which expressed support for other world Communist parties.

B. PERIOD 2 (OCT. 70-MAR. 71)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

One obvious feature of this period was the sharp downward trend in Foreign broadcasts as opposed to the increase in the number of Domestic broadcasts. Most likely this could have been attributable to the aftermath of the "1970 Sugar Harvest Failure". This is further substantiated by the sharp increase in the number of self-critical and neutral broadcasts to a point beyond that of favorable broadcast, a feat that would not be duplicated again during the entire research period.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

The forementioned situation was accompanied by the following consistent attitudinal and behavioral changes: a slight mellowing of attitudes and behavioral reactions toward the U.S. and its allies, in that the unfavorable phenomena showed a general decrease during this time frame; and, accompanying this decrease was a slight upward shift

in neutral attitudinal themes. Again, most of the adverse expressions were politically related, followed by S-C-E and military expressions which were much lower in number, but somewhat equal to each other.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

Relations between Cuba and the USSR appear to have cooled during this time frame in that the previously favorable expressions have now been replaced with neutral expressions. While there was some neutral support for the Bloc Supporters, most favorable expressions were directed toward the Deviants, Sympathizers, and Supporters, respectively.

4. PRC, Non-Aligned Africa, and the OAS

The first favorable political expression was directed toward the PRC during this period, while the countries of Non-Aligned Africa and the OAS were targets of adverse political expression.

5. Latin America

Concerning Latin America, there was a sharp drop in both favorable and unfavorable expressions while neutral interest increased. Behaviorally, the only change was a slight increase in unfavorable reactions.

6. Outliers and Communist Asia

Attitudinal expressions toward Outliers were still

neutral while favorable and unfavorable behavioral reactions were both low.

Although favorable political expressions were still being directed toward Communist Asia, no behavioral reactions were recorded during this or any other time period under investigation.

7. Special Categories

Favorable Chilean broadcasts continued to emanate from Cuba, as well as several broadcasts concerning World Communist Party Support and one broadcast favoring Korean unification.

C. PERIOD 3 (APR. 71-SEPT. 71)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

During this period the number of Foreign broadcasts again exceeded the declining Domestic broadcasts. In this situation, which is opposite to that of Period 2, favorable and neutral broadcasts were also down sharply.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

There was a significant increase in unfavorable attitudinal expressions and behavioral responses toward the U.S. and its allies, which would not be witnessed again in such magnitude, until much later in the research period. Neutral expressions towards the U.S. showed a slight increase while those relating to the U.S. plus allies

decreased. The overwhelming number of expressions were politically related, followed by S-C-E and military themes. Consistent with this attitudinal phenomena, favorable behavioral responses toward the U.S. and its allies continued to decrease or remain constant.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

Contrasted to the unfavorable situation which existed between Cuba and the U.S., an opposite, or highly favorable attitudinal situation began to unfold between Cuba and the Soviet oriented countries. It appears that the previous period of neutral relations had now transitioned into a favorable phenomena since neutral expressions fell sharply. The favorable expressions were evenly distributed between the USSR and its allied country categories and primarily S-C-E motivated, followed closely by political themes. In spite of this favorable attitudinal environment, Cuba's behavior towards the USSR remained at its constant low and there was only a slight increase in favorable responses to the USSR plus allies.

4. PRC

Although favorable political and S-C-E inspired expressions towards the PRC reached their peak, behavioral responses were not visible during this period or any other period of the research.

5. Non-Aligned Africa

Political and S-C-E related expressions towards Non-Aligned Africa were also prominent during this period, but again no behavioral responses were to be noted in this category until much later in the research.

6. Non-Aligned Europe

Cuba's first expressions towards Non-Aligned Europe were recorded during this period and both were S-C-E related.

7. Latin America

The attitudinal situation between Cuba and Latin America was a mixture between that towards the U.S. oriented countries and the Soviet oriented countries, in that unfavorable and favorable expressions rose while neutrals declined. The same mixture is behaviorally true since favorable reactions remained constant while unfavorable responses rose slightly. The adverse attitudinal expressions primarily involved political and military themes, much of which was directed towards Brazil.

8. Outliers, UN, and the OAS

Cuba's attitude toward the Outliers and the UN remained neutral, while that towards the OAS became more adversely pronounced and politically inspired.

9. Communist Asia

Strong politically favorable expressions towards Communist Asia continued to emanate from Cuba.

10. Special Categories

Cuba became more neutral in its expressions of itself as an instrument of the USSR during the period.

Favorable Chile broadcasts became more prominent and Cuba continued to overtly advocate revolution in Latin America.

Support for Other World Communist Parties decreased to one broadcast during the period.

D. PERIOD 4 (OCT. 71-MAR. 72)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

For only the second time in the research period the number of Domestic broadcasts exceeded that of Foreign broadcasts, although both were at an all-time high. Consistent with this was also a sharp upsurge in all categories of Domestic broadcasts.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

Under these circumstances there was a general leveling off of unfavorable attitudinal expressions and a sharp decrease in unfavorable behavioral reactions towards the U.S. and its allies. However, neutral expressions towards the U.S. and its allies reached a peak that would

not be exceeded until Period 9. Although adverse political expressions were predominant, S-C-E and military related themes were still well represented.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

Keeping in mind that the unfavorable attitudinal situation between Cuba and the U.S. was at near all-time high, the favorable attitudinal situation between the USSR and Cuba had reached an undisputed all-time high during this period which would not be surpassed in the course of the research. (Referring back to Figures 3 and 5, an interesting relationship is now obvious. The graphs shows that from this point on, the unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S. will parallel that of the favorable expressions toward the USSR. This trend similarity will persist until Period 8, where an anomaly occurs) Most of this favorable environment is S-C-E related and an increasingly significant amount of it involves the Bloc Supporters and Bloc Deviants. Despite this favorable attitudinal change, a similar behavioral change toward the USSR and its allies was surprisingly not evident, and in fact, the situation actually worsened during the period.

4. PRC, Non-Aligned Africa/Europe, UN, and the OAS

Attitudinal expressions toward the PRC became more neutral and focused on political themes; and, expressions

toward Africa and the U.N. also became more neutral. While attitudes towards Europe continued in a favorable vein, those towards the OAS still ranged from unfavorable to neutral.

5. Latin America

Attitudinally, favorable expressions towards Latin America were constant while unfavorable themes declined and neutrals climbed. Behaviorally, favorable interactions increased while unfavorable ones declined. Most attitudinal expressions remained politically motivated.

6. Outliers and Communist Asia

Several S-C-E related expressions were directed towards the Outliers, while increasingly significant political interest was expressed towards the countries of Communist Asia.

7. Special Categories

Chilean broadcasts were now evenly distributed between favorable and neutral, and broadcasted support for Other World Communist Parties continued at a minimum.

E. PERIOD 5 (APR. 72-SEPT. 72)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

During this period there was a sharp decrease in Foreign and Domestic broadcasts and a similar downward trend in all three categories of Domestic broadcasts.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

Unfavorable attitudinal comments toward the U.S. and its allies plunged sharply downward as a result of a significant decrease in adverse political and economic expressions. Neutral expressions showed only a minor downward trend. Regardless of this improving situation, these attitudes were not manifested in Cuba's behavior toward the U.S. and its allies; in fact, unfavorable behavior toward the U.S. and its allies actually increased from the previous period.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

A virtual opposite situation existed between Cuba and the USSR and its allies concerning expressed attitudes and manifested behavior. While favorable attitudes plunged sharply downward, neutral expressions remained static in the case of the USSR, and continued to increase in the case of the USSR plus allies. Nearly all of the attitudes were S-C-E related and evenly distributed between the USSR and the Bloc Supporters. Expressions toward Bloc Deviants shifted from favorable to neutral in comparison with the previous period, but were still S-C-E related. Behaviorally, the number of favorable interactions showed a very sharp increase and appeared to be lagging the favorable attitudinal situation which existed in the previous period.

4. PRC

During this period the last favorable attitudinal comment was expressed toward the PRC.

5. Non-Aligned Africa

A significant increase in favorable political attitudes towards Non-Aligned Africa was also witnessed during this period.

6. Latin America

Relative to Latin America, there was an increase in both favorable and unfavorable attitudes while neutral expression held constant. Again, most of the expressions were politically related and all of the favorable expressions were directed towards Peru. With the exception of favorable interactions being constant the behavioral situation between Cuba and Latin America was consistent with that of the attitudinal expressions.

7. Outliers and the OAS

Expressions toward the Outliers and the OAS subsided somewhat and appeared to shift to a more neutral position.

8. Communist Asia

Cuban attitudes towards Communist Asia peaked during this period. Nearly all were favorable and politically related.

9. Special Categories

Chilean broadcasts again shifted to a more favorable tone, and Support for World Communist Parties achieved a peak during this period; a broadcast relating to the reunification of North/South Vietnam was also made.

F. PERIOD 6 (OCT. 72-MAR. 73)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

During this period Foreign broadcasts reached a near all-time high for the research span, while the number of Domestic broadcasts continued to fall at a slower rate than the previous period. Favorable and neutral Domestic broadcasts also fell at a decreased rate, while the number of self-critical broadcasts increased slightly.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

Unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S. and its allies continued to decrease, while the number of neutral expressions either decreased or remained static. This phenomena was a result of the continuing decrease in adverse political and military themes; however, adverse S-C-E related themes showed a slight increase during the period. Here again, a behavioral lag was apparent since favorable manifestations of the previous "mellowing" attitudinal disposition were now obvious. A probable alternative to this "lag" theory was the "detente-like" atmosphere

which existed between Cuba and the U.S. in the midst of the Anti-Hijacking Treaty, which reached fruition during that time frame. In spite of this promising situation, there still was an increase in the number of unfavorable interactions with the U.S.; and, the same situation was apparent with respect to the U.S. plus allies, but at a higher rate of increase.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

Another significant transition period appeared to occur with respect to Cuba's attitude and behavior toward the USSR and its allies. With respect to the USSR alone, the rate of decrease in favorable expressions began to level off, while the number of neutral expressions rose sharply. S-C-E related themes were still predominant, followed closely by political expressions. A sharp rise in both favorable and neutral expressions was recorded for Cuba's attitude toward the USSR and its allies. Again most of this increase was attributable to a rise in S-C-E related themes, although a significant number of favorable political themes relating to the Bloc Deviant countries was recorded. Also in this period, increasing favorable and neutral interest was expressed toward the Mid-East Soviet Sympathizer countries. In spite of this significant change in attitude, Cuba's behavioral disposition toward

the USSR and its allies remained absolutely static from the previous period.

4. Non-Aligned Africa/Europe

While favorable political support for the Non-Aligned African countries waned, similar support for the Non-Aligned European countries increased slightly.

5. Latin America

Favorable attitudes towards Latin America continued to increase, while unfavorable and neutral expressions declined slightly. The favorable behavioral manifestations toward Latin America showed a sharp rate of increase during the period, while unfavorable behavioral responses decreased slightly. Attitudinally, the expressions were distributed all across the Functional Areas of Target Interest spectrum, although political and S-C-E related themes remained predominant. Most of the favorable attitudinal expressions and behavioral responses were directed towards Peru, Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, and the pro-Cuban Caribbean countries.

6. Outliers and the UN

The Outlier countries and the UN received favorable S-C-E related support and favorable behavioral support in the case of Outliers.

7. OAS and Communist Asia

Adverse political themes toward the OAS showed an increase, and favorable political and S-C-E related themes directed toward the countries of Communist Asia exhibited a significant downward trend.

8. Special Categories

Although Cuba expressed favorable sentiments towards dependence on the USSR, its view towards being an instrument of the USSR were neutral.

Favorable Chilean broadcasts were at a near all-time high, and promotion of revolution in Latin America was still being overtly advocated.

G. PERIOD 7 (APR. 73-OCT. 73)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

The number of Foreign and Domestic broadcasts fell sharply during this period and all categories of Domestic broadcasts showed a similar trend.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

Unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S. and its allies continued to decrease at the same rate, while neutral expressions remained the same as the previous period. The continuing decrease in adverse political comments was responsible for this phenomena. However, as a probable aftermath of the Anti-Hijacking Pact euphoria, an

extremely sharp decrease in favorable behavioral manifestation toward the U.S. and its allies was recorded.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

Concerning relations between Cuba and the USSR, it appears that the transition phase mentioned in the previous period's description had continued to lag into this period. In short, all favorable and neutral attitudinal expressions decreased sharply, and behavioral responses plunged to a near all-time low. It was also during this period that the only unfavorable behavioral interaction occurred between these two countries.

A near similar situation existed between Cuba and the USSR plus allies, with the exception that favorable attitudes and behavior remained constant from the previous period. Most of the favorable expressions were a result of political and S-C-E related responses towards Bloc Deviant countries and the majority of the neutral expressions concerned political responses toward Bloc Supporters and a few towards Bloc Deviants. The last expression of political support for the Mid-East Soviet Sympathizers was also expressed during this period.

4. Non-Aligned Africa and the OAS

There was a significant increase in neutral political attitudes toward the Non-Aligned African countries,

while adverse political comments toward the OAS increased only slightly during the period.

5. Non-Aligned Europe, Outliers, and Communist Asia

Favorable political support for the countries of Non-Aligned Europe decreased slightly, while favorable political and S-C-E related support for the Outlier and Communist Asian countries remained virtually the same as the previous period.

6. Latin America

It was during this period that a significant transition occurred in Cuba's attitudes and behavior toward the Latin American countries. Favorable attitudes showed a significant decrease, while neutral expression went up sharply, and unfavorable expressions increased slightly. In line with this attitudinal change, a behavioral reaction was reflected by a slight decrease in favorable and a slight increase in unfavorable interactions.

7. Special Categories

Attitudinal support for Chile was still predominantly favorable during the period; this period also reflected an increase in Cuba's support for the Other World Communist Parties.

H. PERIOD 8 (OCT. 73-MAR. 73)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

During this period, Foreign broadcasts fell to an all-time low which was equal to that of Period 2, while the number of Domestic broadcasts began to exhibit an upward trend.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

Unfavorable attitudinal expressions toward the U.S. and its allies reached an all-time low at this time, while neutral expressions reached lows which were rarely exceeded previously. Along with this auspicious attitudinal situation, the number of favorable behavioral interactions reached a high which was only exceeded once previously, in Period 6.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

Another transition appeared evident with respect to Cuban-Soviet relations in that there was a sharp decrease in favorable attitudinal expressions toward the USSR and its allies. All expressions were related to S-C-E interests in these countries. Neutral expressions remained constant in the case of the USSR and reached an all-time low in the case of the USSR plus allies. This highly unfavorable attitudinal situation was accompanied by a sharp increase in favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR and its allies.

4. Non-Aligned Africa/Europe

Attitudinal expressions toward Non-Aligned Africa became more politically favorable, while those towards the Non-Aligned European countries remained the same.

5. Outliers, UN, Communist Asia, and the OAS

Favorable attitudes toward the Outliers and the U.N. organization increased, while those towards Communist Asia continued to decrease. Political expressions toward the OAS assumed a neutral tone during this period.

6. Latin America

An attitudinal transition appeared to have occurred with respect to Cuban-Latin American relations during this period. Favorable attitudes were again on the increase, while neutral and unfavorable expressions continued to decrease sharply. All expressions were of a political and S-C-E nature. Again, this favorable attitudinal situation was not evident in Cuba's behavior towards Latin America in that favorable interactions continued to plunge downward.

7. Special Categories

In spite of the encouraging situation which had developed between Cuba and the USSR during the period, Cuba nevertheless expressed an adverse desire towards being an instrument of the USSR.

As an obvious result of Chile's Allende overthrow

in September, Cuba also expectedly shifted to expressions of vehement opposition to the new regime.

During this time frame, Cuba made one overt broadcast which still advocated Revolution in Latin America; and, support for Other World Communist Parties decreased slightly during the period.

I. PERIOD 9 (APR. 74-SEPT. 74)

1. Foreign/Domestic Broadcasts

The number of Foreign broadcasts reversed itself and began to climb upward during this period, while the number of Domestic broadcasts continued their upward slope at about the same rate as the previous period. Also, following the lead of the previous period, the favorable and neutral broadcasts continued upward while the self-critical broadcasts became non-existent.

2. U.S. and U.S. Plus Allies

An apparent anomaly occurred in the attitudinal situation between Cuba and the U.S. and its allies. For the first time since Period 3 and 4, the number of favorable and neutral attitudinal expressions reversed their downward trend and began a sharp upward slope. Since all of these adverse political and S-C-E related expressions were directed towards the U.S., this change could probably be interpreted as a delayed reaction to the alleged U.S. inspired Chilean coup,

which occurred in September 1973. In spite of this inauspicious attitudinal situation, Cuba's manifested behavior toward the U.S. and its allies did not follow suit. As a matter of fact, favorable interactions between these actors reached an unprecedented high during the period, while unfavorable interactions remained static from the previous period.

3. USSR and USSR Plus Allies

With the exception of a rise in neutral attitudinal expressions, the exact opposite of the U.S. situation occurred between Cuba and the USSR and its allies, with respect to the other attitudes and resulting behavior. In all cases, attitudinal expressions and behavioral responses reached an unprecedented low for the research period.

4. Non-Aligned Europe

Although political and S-C-E related support for the Non-Aligned European countries became more neutral, favorable behavioral responses reached a high for the research period.

5. Outliers and Communist Asia

Expressions towards Outliers became more neutral; and, support for Communist Asia became significantly more favorable and of a political and S-C-E nature.

6. OAS and the UN

Although adverse OAS expressions increased significantly, the highest number of favorable interactions between these actors occurred during this period.

U.N. related expressions showed only a slightly less favorable position than from the previous period.

7. Latin America

A similar situation to that of the Cuban-U.S. relationship occurred between Cuba and Latin America. Again, unfavorable attitudinal expressions and behavioral responses began an upward trend, while neutral expressions remained constant. Although favorable attitudinal expressions continued upward, favorable behavioral interactions reversed the previous downward trend and climbed to a heretofore unsurpassed high for the research period.

8. Special Categories

Adverse Chilean broadcasts continued at the same pace as the previous period and support for Other World Communist parties increased slightly.

In conclusion, it is also significant to note that the only favorable statements made by Cuba relating to renewed relations with the U.S. occurred during this period.

VII. PROBLEM AREAS AND LIMITATIONS

Having completed a comprehensive analysis of Cuba's world view over the past four and one-half years, it can be stated conclusively and unequivocally that Cuba's attitudes are not consistently indicative of current or future behavior, and Cuba's behavior does not accurately reflect its attitudes of the world. Thus, if we were forced to attach a statistical measure of correlation between Cuba's attitudes and resulting behavior, it would be low.

Remembering that the intent of this research was to focus on and determine the "how" of attitude and behavioral changes rather than the "why", it is appropriate to consider some of the intervening variables, problems, and biases that could have influenced our findings, analysis, conclusions and future projections, which follow.

While it seems unlikely that a more reliable and comprehensive source, than a report of a country's domestic and foreign broadcasts, could be used to measure its attitudes of the world, in any country and especially a communist country, propaganda has great value and impact. Often a country is obligated to take a predetermined stand on a particular issue or international situation, regardless of whether its people and government may disagree with it at

the time. This is particularly appropriate in the case of Cuba's "expected" anti-U.S. role and pro-Soviet position. In the case of the current research, although it certainly cannot be disputed that Cuba engages in extensive propagandizing, it appeared to have little, if any, effect on their expressed attitudes. This is evidenced merely by looking at the consistently downward trend in unfavorable comments toward the U.S. and the "see-saw" trend in favorable attitudes toward the USSR. Therefore, we could say, in the short run propagandizing by a country could influence its expressed attitudes, but in the long run the effect is negligible. Therefore, analyzing FBIS is a reasonable operationalization of Cuban attitudes, vice propaganda.

While the WEIS has great merit in arriving at a country's real-world behavioral patterns, the source used for WEIS coding is of utmost importance. In the current research, it was thought that in several categories an insufficient number of interactions were available to draw realistic and hopefully reliable conclusions. By using the Journal Latin America, there was what appeared to be, a built-in bias to report a larger number of events, occurrences, and interactions involving other Latin American countries. This is not meant as derogatory and should naturally be expected when utilizing any publication

which focuses on a particular sphere or area. This shortcoming can be easily remedied by the addition of other representative and diversified sources, preferably that of newspaper clipping services and intelligence reports, which generally include impartial reports of worldwide events.

While it was attempted to make reference to obvious lags in behavior or leads in attitude, the entire phenomena of possible leads and lags, in the results of this research alone, could occupy substantial time, space and effort beyond the scope and capability of this project. Nevertheless, it is an area of concern and interest which should be addressed in any follow-on projects as a next logical step in this type of research. For instance, are there any consistent patterns of lead and lag over the various time periods? Does favorable behavior towards the USSR exhibit a consistent periodic lag behind attitudes, or vice-versa? Does a periodic unfavorable attitudinal trend toward the USSR lead a favorable (less unfavorable) attitudinal trend toward the U.S., or vice versa? Apply the same type of reasoning to all categories, and it becomes increasingly apparent that a whole new complex area of investigation has come into play.

While only a few of the pitfalls and possible errors of this research have been identified, they did constitute

those problems with the greatest significance and impact on the results. Overall, it appears that any such unfavorable phenomena has been kept to an absolute minimum. The point remains, although this methodology and resulting conclusions may possess some shortcomings, it nevertheless did accomplish what it intended to do and appears to be the best tool for accomplishing this difficult task at present.

A. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE LIMITATIONS OF PREDICTION

The following chapter configures the results of this study into a format that could be useful to the policymaker and intelligence officer. However, before looking at this it seems appropriate to first enlighten the reader on some of the difficulties that can occur if the art of prediction is not viewed in the proper perspective.

The wizardry of contemporary technology notwithstanding, the essential and lasting methodology of future-predicting was set forth in the early 18th century by the great Leibniz. One sentence, taken from his "Principles of Nature and of Grace," will suffice to express the crucial elements of Leibniz's law of continuity: The present is big with the future, the future might be read in the past, the distant is expressed in the near.

The premises and assumptions of Leibniz's law are vital to our belief that predicting and forecasting are

possible. For the moment, however, it should be stressed that not all the marvels of computer technology and related devices have in any way supplanted our reliance upon this profound, if questionable, Leibnizian view of the relation among past, present, and future. Either the future does lie in the present, and hence is subject to observation through dissection, or it does not. And if it does not, all the computers and systems analysis and linear programming in the world will not help us. For it is sheer delusion to suppose that anything short of H.G. Well's Time Machine can in fact get us into the future, as technology gets us across space to the moon.

Albert Somit seems to subscribe to the latter thesis by stating the following points: (1) contemporary forays into the future are no better, and generally worse, ceteris paribus, than the forays into the future that our grandfathers--Tocqueville, Comte, Marx, et al--made; (2) the only real utility of these fast accumulating reports and books on the future is the often enlightening, generally informative, sometimes brilliant perceptions they contain the present. [Ref. 44, p. 261-262]

Referring to the work that demographers and other statistical analysts do by way of explicating the world we live in, Somit says, "it is indeed important to know how big 'big' is, how fast 'fast' is, etc. These activities

are valuable, as are the technological devices that today accompany and reinforce them. They will not, however, supplant speculation, raw speculation, when it comes to predictions that go more than a very short time from the immediate present. /Ref. 44, p. 263/

By this time it should be obvious that Somit believes that the present is not big with the future. Nor, let it be well understood, was the past ever big with what is now the present. He says we are confusing continuity of chronology with continuity of circumstance and event. /Ref. 44, p. 263/

Nothing could seem more certain to the individual for whom reality consists of the hard data of atoms, molecules, reflexes, social-security numbers, and the like than that absolute knowledge of the hard data of the present should yield--properly processed in the machines--knowledge of the future. But Somit says, it won't and never will and the reason is that the present does not contain the future, the far is not to be found in the near, nor was our present ever contained in the past, not if what we are concerned with is change. /Ref. 44, p. 264/ "trends" are particularly suspect. A trend, the dictionary tells us, is the general direction taken by a stream, a shoreline, etc.; it is an underlying or prevailing tendency or

inclination. These are all tempting words for the historian or predictor of societal development. How easy it is, as we look back over the past--that is, of course, the "past" that has been selected for us by historians and social scientists--to see in it trends and tendencies that appear to possess the iron necessity and clear directionality of growth in a plant or organism. We think of these "trends" as cumulative movements, as genetic sequences, as actually causal. But, the relation among past, present, and future is chronological, not causal.

What Emile Durkheim wrote on all this is profound and, obviously, still relevant: It said, writes Durkheim, "that history has for its object precisely the linking of events in their order of succession. But it is impossible to conceive how the stage which a civilization has reached at a given moment could be the determining cause of a subsequent state. The stages of that humanity successively traverses do not engender one another. [Ref. 44, p. 265]

"All that one can observe experimentally.....is a series of changes among which a causal bond does not exist. The antecedent stage does not produce the subsequent one, but the relation between them is exclusively chronological. Under these circumstances all scientific prevision is impossible." [Ref. 44, p. 265]

That one can, through religious or philosophical metaphor, summarize, encapsulate, on the basis of skillful selection of a few events and changes from the past, is not to be doubted; that one can form in his mind, through this type of selection and through one or another metaphor, "trends" that have vivid meaning to his mind is not to be doubted either. However, to confuse "trends" with processes that have in fact genetic continuity and causal connection in time is to take the metaphor of growth much too seriously in its application to human behavior in time.

The hypothesis of growth is useful only in the understanding of entities that do actually grow and develop--such as plants and organisms--and for all else it is either naive or dangerous. /Ref. 44, p. 265/

Somit goes on to use a model of change in time that seems to be much better than models drawn from organic growth. It is based on what happens with the throw of the dice. Hypnotized by either the surpassing good luck or bad luck, one may imagine the existence of continuities too extraordinary to be explained by chance. Nevertheless, such continuities are random and chronological, not causal. Even if twenty naturals were thrown in succession, no genetic trend would exist; only the laws of probability would have been stretched. Even twenty or a hundred naturals would

not have in their unbroken succession, the slightest influence upon what the next throw would yield. To predict anything on the basis of five, twenty, or a hundred naturals in succession would be, plainly, impossible.

Could we therefore predict nothing? Not at all. We could confidently predict that the dice game would go on, that gambling would go on, that Las Vegas would continue to sprawl even farther out into the desert. and that the number of Americans visiting Las Vegas, at the present rates of increase, would by A.D. 2100 reach the point where there would be twenty-eight little old ladies in front of each slot machine in contrast to the two invariably there now.

Somehow this kind of predicting isn't very exciting once your hopes have been raised by apparent continuities of the dice, but it is still prediction, isn't it?, and it is the kind of prediction, like it or not, that you will get in books on the year 2000.

The crucial point, though, is this: what is significantly different and novel about American society in 1968 did not "grow out of" American society of 1868, fond though we may be of the lovely, thought-narcotizing metaphor of growth with all its comfortable words regarding genetic continuity, trends, causality, and the like. What is new

and vital in science today--that is what has changed in time--could not possibly have been predicted a generation ago. Of course not. What is manifest today was not then latent, was not "in" the science of that time. /Ref. 44, p. 266/

In summary, two points should be clear: (1) events do not marry and have little events that grow into big events which in turn marry and have little events, etc.; (2) small social changes do not accumulate directionally and continuously to become big changes. We pretend in our histories and sociologies that such is the case, but it is all a posteriori, suffers badly from an affliction known as the pathetic fallacy, and does more to assuage the pain of intellectual disorder than it does to throw light on the actual process of social change.

At this point the reader may be justified in asking himself what purpose there is in prediction.....what value can be derived from it in light of the foregoing? The answer to this lies in the following.....the often enlightening, generally informative, sometimes brilliant perceptions that are revealed about the present. No doubt this point alone makes "future-predicting" worthwhile, for there is nothing like an assignment to gaze into the future for sharpening one's awareness of what lies around him in the

present. Furthermore, significant credibility can be assumed to accompany predictions when utilized for short-term rather than a long-range purpose.

VIII. PREDICTIVE CAPABILITY AND APPLICABILITY FOR POLICY-MAKING COMMUNITY

A. INTRODUCTION

It is important for the policymaker to be able to forecast the future actions and reactions of a specific country, to a certain degree, before implementing any policy concerning that country. However, before attempting such a forecast, it is imperative that he has a fairly reliable and thorough analysis of past and current attitudinal and behavioral relationships of that country with other countries and especially with his own.

For the intelligence officer, the relationship between Third World countries and the superpowers is absolutely necessary for assessing potential/future allies, sympathizers, and supporters, whether it be in time of peace, cold war, or hot war, either current or projected.

Both of these situations demand a reliable and consistent methodology for the gathering and analysis of data necessary for each of these individuals to arrive at a decision or make an assessment, whether it be for political, economic, socio-cultural, or intelligence purposes.

An objective of this project was to create and experiment with a new research tool for arriving at Cuba's views

toward the other major actors of the world. In so doing, it was found necessary to account not only for attitudinal expressions, but behavioral patterns as well. Having done this, it was further intended that such an analysis of past actions would not only be useful in assessing the current outlook of a specific country, but also aid in a projection of the future attitudes and behavior that could reasonably be expected from that country.

Theoretically, the decisionmakers can apply this methodology towards the resource publications of his choice over any two periods in time, using as many or as few categories as he desires. By determining a trend (increase, decrease or constant) between those two periods he can then compare it with the following analysis of the consistent trends and relationships between categories which were in evidence during each period of the research. (A complete comparison of each periodic trend for each major category can be seen in Figure 16).

It is perhaps important to understand how this analysis was accomplished before proceeding. With that purpose in mind, look at the following excerpt from Figure 16.

CATEGORY/PERIOD	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
DOMESTIC BROADCASTS	↑	↓	↑	↓	↓	↓	↑	↑
DOMESTIC NEUTRAL	↑	↓	↑	↓	↓	↓	↑	↑
U.S. PLUS ALLIES FAVOR.	→	↓	→	↑	↓	→	→	→




FIGURE 16. CATEGORY PERIODIC TRENDS

In the above situation, the analysis would be as follows:

(A) As the number of Domestic broadcasts increased, the number of:

1. Neutral Domestic broadcasts increased, and
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant.

(See (A) to follow)

The following example will illustrate a different situation.

CATEGORY/PERIOD	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
U.S. ATTITUDES UNFAVORABLE	↓	↑	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↑
L.A. BEHAVIORAL UNFAVORABLE	↑	↑	↓	↑	↓	↑	→	↑

(LL) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased:

1. No consistencies or relationships were found to exist with further categories.

(See (LL) to follow)

It is important to remember that all category relationships are interrelated. For instance if the following (FF) occurs, (favorable attitudes toward the USSR decreased) not only are all the consistent relationship listed under it applicable but also (CC) since it is related to (CC) 1. which is the same as (FF).

An analysis of Figure 16 now follows.

B. PREDICTIVE CAPABILITY

(A) As the number of Domestic broadcasts increased, the number of:

1. neutral Domestic broadcasts increased, and
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant.

(AA) As the number of Domestic broadcasts decreased, the number of:

1. neutral Domestic broadcasts decreased.

(B) As Foreign broadcasts increased, the number of:

1. favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR decreased or remained constant,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant, and
4. favorable attitudes and behavior toward Latin America increased or remained constant.

(BB) As Foreign broadcasts decreased:

1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
2. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased, and

3. unfavorable behavioral interactions increased or remained constant.

(C) As favorable Domestic broadcasts increased:

1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant, and
2. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant.

(CC) As favorable Domestic broadcasts decreased:

1. favorable attitudes toward the USSR. decreased,
2. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased, and
3. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased.

(D) As neutral Domestic broadcasts increased:

1. neutral attitudes toward the USSR increased or remained constant, and
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant.

(DD) As neutral Domestic broadcasts decreased:

1. favorable interactions toward the USSR increased or remained constant,
2. unfavorable interactions toward the U.S. increased or remained constant.

3. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased, and
4. unfavorable interactions toward the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant.

(E) As the self-critical Domestic broadcasts increased:

1. neutral attitudes toward the USSR increased,
2. favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR decreased or remained constant,
3. favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR plus allies decreased or remained constant,
4. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
5. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or remained constant,
6. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased, and
7. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(EE) As self-critical Domestic broadcasts decreased:

1. unfavorable behavioral interactions toward the U.S. increased or remained constant,
2. unfavorable behavioral interactions toward the U.S. plus allies increased, and
3. unfavorable behavioral interactions toward Latin America increased or remained constant.

- (F) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR increased:
1. favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR increased or remained constant,
 2. favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies increased,
 3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant, and
 4. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant.
- (FF) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR decreased:
1. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased, and
 2. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased,
- (G) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR increased:
1. favorable behavior towards the USSR decreased or remained constant,
 2. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies decreased or remained constant,
 3. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or remained constant,
 4. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant, and

5. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(GG) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR decreased:

1. favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies increased,
2. neutral attitudes toward the USSR plus allies decreased,
3. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies increased or remained constant,
4. favorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased or remained constant,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
6. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
7. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased,
8. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased,
9. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
10. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America increased,
11. favorable behavior towards Latin America decreased or remained constant, and

12. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

(GGG) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR remained constant:

1. favorable behavior towards the USSR increased,
2. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies increased,
3. unfavorable and neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
4. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased,
6. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
7. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased,
8. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
9. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased,
10. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased,
11. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant, and

12. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(H) As favorable behavioral interactions toward the USSR increased:

1. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies increased,
2. unfavorable and neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
3. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased,
5. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
6. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased,
7. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
8. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased,
9. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased,
10. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant, and
11. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(HH) As favorable behavior towards the USSR decreased:

1. favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies decreased or remained constant,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
5. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant, and
6. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

(HHH) As favorable behavior towards the USSR remained constant:

1. favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies increased,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes towards the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
4. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant, and
5. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(I) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies increased:

1. favorable attitudes toward U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant.

(II) As favorable attitudes toward the USSR plus allies decreased:

1. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
3. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant,
4. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant, and
5. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

(J) As neutral attitudes toward the USSR plus allies increased:

1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant, and
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

(JJ) As neutral attitudes towards the USSR plus allies decreased:

1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America decreased or remained constant, and
3. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(K) As favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies increased:

1. favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased,
3. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased,
5. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased,
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant, and
7. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(KK) As favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies decreased:

1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant,
4. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant, and
7. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(KKK) As favorable behavior towards the USSR plus allies remained constant:

1. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased or remained constant,
3. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
4. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
5. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased, and

6. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,

(L) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. increased:

1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased,
2. favorable and unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
3. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
4. unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased,
5. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
6. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased,
7. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant,
8. unfavorable attitudes and behavior toward Latin America increased, and
9. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant,

(LL) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. decreased:

1. No consistencies or relationships were found to exist with further categories.

(M) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. increased:

1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant, and
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(MM) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. decreased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
3. neutral and unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased, and
5. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(N) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. increased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
3. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased,

4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
5. favorable attitudes toward the Latin America increased, and
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant.

(NN) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant,
3. favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased,
4. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
5. favorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant, and
6. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased.

(NNN) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. remained constant:

1. favorable behavior toward the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
2. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant, and

3. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

(O) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. increased:

1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased,
3. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased, and
4. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant.

(OO) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. decreased:

1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant,
2. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased,
3. favorable and unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased,
4. favorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant,
5. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased,
6. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased, and

7. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(OOO) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. remained constant:

1. favorable attitudes toward the U.S. remained constant,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies remained constant,
3. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant, and
4. unfavorable attitudes and behavior towards Latin America increased.

(P) As favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased:

1. other than the preceding, no further consistent relationships occurred.

(PP) As favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased:

1. neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased,
2. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased,
3. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased,

4. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased,
and
5. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(PPP) As favorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies remained constant:

1. other than the preceding no further consistent relationships occurred.

(Q) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased or remained constant,
2. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant, and
3. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(QQ) As neutral attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant.

(R) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies increased:

1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant, and

2. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(RR) As unfavorable attitudes toward the U.S. plus allies decreased:

1. other than the preceding, no future consistent relationships occurred.

(S) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased or remained constant,
2. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased, and
3. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant.

(SS) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased:

1. other than the preceding, no further consistent relationship occurred.

(SSS) As favorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies remained constant:

1. other than the preceding, no further consistent relationships occurred.

- (T) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies increased:
1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased, and
 2. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant.
- (TT) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies decreased:
1. favorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant,
 2. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased,
 3. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased, and
 4. favorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.
- (TTT) As unfavorable behavior towards the U.S. plus allies remained constant:
1. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased or remained constant,
 2. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America increased, and
 3. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

- (U) As favorable attitudes toward Latin America increased:
1. neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased or remained constant.
- (UU) As favorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased:
1. neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased,
 2. favorable behavior towards Latin America decreased or remained constant, and
 3. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.
- (UUU) As favorable attitudes toward Latin America remained constant:
1. other than the preceding, no further consistent relationships occurred.
- (V) As neutral attitudes toward Latin America increased:
1. other than the preceding, no further consistent relationships occurred.
- (VV) As neutral attitudes toward Latin America decreased:
1. other than the preceding, no further consistent relationships occurred.
- (VVV) As neutral attitudes toward Latin America remained constant:
1. unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America increased, and

2. favorable and unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

(W) As unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America increased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

(WW) As unfavorable attitudes toward Latin America decreased:

1. other than the preceding, no further relationships occurred.

(X) As favorable behavior towards Latin America increased:

1. other than the preceding, no further relationships occurred.

(XX) As favorable behavior toward Latin America decreased:

1. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased or remained constant.

(XXX) As favorable behavior toward Latin America remained constant:

1. unfavorable behavior towards Latin America increased.

C. APPLICABILITY TO THE POLICY-MAKING COMMUNITY

It is reasonable to assume that since all of the forementioned trends were consistently related throughout the present four and one-half year period, there is a high probability that such relationships will continue to exist in the future. With this assumption in mind, the decisionmaker now has a means by which to attempt a valid forecast towards a country's future attitudinal and behavioral patterns.

Applied to the intelligence community it is recognized that the successful intelligence analyst will be well-read and remain current with all facets of his particular area. Generally, his data base will be a result of "all sources" of which FBIS may be only one. Thus, any attempt at trending or analyzing a country's current disposition or world view is usually a result of a "gut feeling" of past and current trends, gained only through experience on the part of the individual analyst. Put another way, it would rarely be seen whereas a specific country's attitudes and behavior towards any other actor could be specifically and consistently determined through usage of a tested methodology. However, with only a minimum of familiarization with the two primary methodological tools used in this research, specifically Content

Analysis, and WEIS procedures, it is reasonable to assume that an analyst could employ this combination to arrive at consistently derived past trends and a current state of relations between an actor's and numerous target actors.

IX. CUBA'S FUTURE AND A PRESCRIPTION
FOR THE U.S. POLICYMAKER

A. CUBA'S FUTURE

As a result of the 1970 harvest failures, the Cuban regime is now moving toward a more institutionalized and less militant revolutionary order. While other alternative tendencies exist, the most likely pattern of institutionalization for the future is that of a Soviet-type, unless fundamental changes occur in Cuba's domestic and especially international environment.

I should now like to discuss these other alternatives and conclude by focusing on the Soviet-type. [Ref. 18, p.229]

Each of these alternative futures presupposes continued rule by Fidel at least in a titular capacity as head of the regime, and as the principal generator of mass loyalty and legitimizing agent for the Cuban leadership.

ALTERNATIVE 1 - Toward Fidelista Populism.

Fidelista populism surfaced briefly and inconclusively in the immediate aftermath of the harvest failure, most likely as a reaction to the threat posed by ALTERNATIVE 3, yet to be discussed. Being more institutionally and popularly oriented, it would strive to regain fidelista hegemony with the support of those military elements

most closely affiliated with Fidel, and to a lesser degree, Raul Castro.

Though more responsive to the needs of the population than in the past, fidelist populism would still strive to preserve some of the revolutionary fervor of the 1960's. It would lay greater stress on radical socioeconomic objectives, and it would also maintain a more militant posture toward the U.S. and Latin America. Toward the latter, for instance, it would pursue a dual-track strategy of endorsing armed revolution against those Latin American states closely aligned with the U.S. while courting more independent regimes such as Peru. Through continued emphasis on forcing the pace of development would prevent major reallocations of resources to the consumer sector, there nevertheless would be greater inclination to ease austerity through improvements in distribution of goods and services in order to maintain popular support.

Overall, this appears to be the most remote possibility of the three alternatives, at the present time. The findings of this research tend to support this conclusion in the following manner:

1. the trend appears toward less emphasis on promoting revolution,
2. a less militant posture towards the U.S. and Latin America is indicated, and

3. the Domestic broadcasts do not indicate a trend towards easing austerity through improvements in the distribution of goods and services to the consumer.

ALTERNATIVE 2 - Toward "Tropical Titoism".

This would be toward institutionalization of the revolutionary process along essentially national Communist or revisionist lines with the aim of warding off further Soviet ascendancy, whether direct or indirect. This alternative was explicitly rejected by Fidel during the height of his confrontation with the Soviets in 1968, because, at the time it signified a moderation of the Revolution. Nevertheless, it could become the most attractive alternative since it is virtually the only one left in avoiding institutionalization under a pro-Soviet framework.

Internally, it would lead to major realignments among the elite elements within the Cuban hierarchy and to significant alterations in Cuba's domestic and foreign policies. Within the regime, it would require the formation of a new, essentially anti-Soviet coalition of fidelistas and non-fidelistas, opposed to rising Soviet and PSP influence.

Owing to the heightened influence of more Western-oriented elements of the Cuban leadership, this could lead to the modernization and democratization of Cuba's internal order-for example, through decentralization of the state

economy, reintroduction of market relationships, possible decollectivization of part of the agrarian sector, the establishment of representative institutions for more effective worker participation in plant management, and popular participation in local government. Internationally, this type regime would strive to adopt a more independent posture which would reduce Cuba's dependence on the Soviet bloc while avoiding a complete rupture. In turn, such a nationalist posture would require further diversification of Cuba's trade ties with Western Europe and Japan as well as her partial reintegration into the Latin American community. It would also depend at a minimum, upon the normalization of economic relations with the U.S.

This alternative appears to be realistic and has some basis in fact, according to this research. During the research the following trends were seen as indications of this alternative becoming reality.

1. few favorable comments in support of Cuba's dependence on the USSR,
2. few favorable comments advocating Cuba's position as an instrument of the USSR,
3. significant attitudinal support was expressed for the Bloc Deviants during most periods,
4. domestically, there were indications of decentralization of the economy, more worker participation in plant management, and popular participation in local government through elections,

5. greater economic interest and support was exhibited for the Outliers (Japan, France, Canada) and the countries of Non-Aligned Europe, (Western Europe)
6. a tendency towards normalization of relations with the U.S., and
7. a tendency towards reintegration into the Latin American community, independent of the OAS or any other U.S. controlled organization.

ALTERNATIVE 3 - Toward Soviet Bureaucratic Communism.

Actually, the strongest tendency now emerging is toward the institutionalization of the regime along the lines of a more Sovietized bureaucratic order. This alternative would impose the greatest limitations of Fidel's authority and that of the fidelistas in the areas of economic policy-making, public administration, and foreign affairs. It would lead to the ascendance of technocratic and bureaucratic elements drawn from civilian and military ranks. It would also allow for greater influence by the "old Communists" from the PSP who would strive to revitalize and strengthen the role of the party. This tendency thus reflects the current rise of Soviet influence over Cuban affairs as well as Moscow's heightened ability to extract major policy concessions from the Cuban leadership. In effect, the Soviets would act as the external monitor, if not regulator, of Cuban affairs and as the sponsor of the bureaucratic Communist alternative.

The pivotal figure in the move toward a more Soviet-ized bureaucratic order would be Raúl Castro. He has long enjoyed Moscow's confidence as a politically reliable Cuban leader and a competent administrator, in marked contrast to his brother. Securely positioned in the government, Raúl could give internal impetus to the reorganization of the Cuban government along lines acceptable to Moscow. Moreover, he could provide the cementing link between two divergent tendencies within the regime--the military and civilian technicians or administrators on the one hand, and his brother and the veteran fidelistas on the other.

On the economic front, this alternative would probably speed Cuba's economic recovery due to more rational planning and orderly processes of governance, and because it could obtain even higher levels of Soviet bloc support.

The bureaucratic alternative would also continue many of the post-1970 harvest trends in Cuba's domestic and foreign affairs. Hence, it would be less committed to societal redemption than was charismatic-hardship Communism. Instead, it would place a premium on obtaining maximum production and efficiency in the economy, and in order to do it might resort to even higher levels of societal regimentation, such as further enforcement of labor discipline and repression of intellectual or popular dissent. On the

international front, it would be receptive to normalized relations with more Latin American governments and possibly to restoration--with Moscow's approval--of limited economic ties with the U.S...(The current research sustains this thesis) Nevertheless, Cuba would become more closely integrated with the Soviets, while her heightened dependence could augur an ever-increasing Soviet presence on the island--not only politically and economically but also militarily.

Too precipitous of a tendency toward Sovietized bureaucratic order could generate nationalist resentment. This might occur with a highly visible Soviet political and especially military presence--in contrast to the low visibility of the submarine servicing facility at Cienfuegos--or in the event of an open attempt to depose Fidel from power. Despite his tarnished image, the continued popularity of the Cuban leader as the very symbol and incarnation of the Revolution may well act as a deterrent to greater influence by the Soviets and their domestic allies. Hence, the movement toward a Soviet-style bureaucratic Communism would probably try to work around and with Fidel rather than to challenge him openly.

Of the three alternative futures, Gonzalez believed that "Tropical Titoism" probably represents the most viable

internal pattern of institutionalization, since it would strengthen the revolutionary coalition through closer alignment between fidelists and non-fidelista leadership elements. [Ref. 18 p. 234] On the international front, however, the Titoist alternative has thus far not been a realistic option for the Cuban leadership. Neither Fidel nor other members of the Cuban regime are likely to move towards this alternative, with all of its attendant risks of Soviet retaliations, unless there is more assurance that the U.S. is prepared to deal with a more independent Castro regime.

B. A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE U.S. POLICYMAKER

For the U.S. policymaker there is one macro-historical trend which was predominant throughout the course of this research. That is, while there was no consistently favorable relationship between Cuba and the USSR, there were generally a decreasing amount of unfavorable indicators (attitudes and behavior) toward the U.S., which should perhaps be interpreted as a signal for the U.S. policymakers to review our current policy towards Cuba.

As a starting point, the U.S. could take the initiative, in active cooperation with other countries of the Western Hemisphere, to lift collective and unilateral sanctions imposed on Cuba. This can be accomplished by recognizing that Cuban foreign policy has changed in deed, even as the

rhetoric remains much the same, as this research demonstrated. It is important for us to remember that the undoing of negative policies does not commit the U.S. or the OAS to restore Cuba's sugar quota, to readmit Cuba to the inter-American system, to provide Cuba with strategic goods, or to re-establish diplomatic relations.

In altering its public stance, the U.S. might eventually convince the Cuban leadership that the "Colossus of the North" does not seek Cuba's return to her former client status, but only her escape from an ever-increasing Soviet influence. "Such a posture would need to convey a commitment that the U.S. would refrain from attempting to depose a more vulnerable Cuban regime that seeks to limit--let alone to break--its protective association with Moscow."

Ref. 17 p. 737

Simultaneously, the U.S. would need to verify its good intentions by providing Havana with the incentives for modifying its policy. To this end, Washington might begin by initiating the following action: Ref. 37

1. Congressional repeal of the 1962 Cuban Resolution,
2. Promptly inaugurate intensive consultations within the OAS for rescinding its decision of 1964 establishing diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba. (This action would free each member to deal bilaterally with Cuba)

3. Given a constructive Cuban response to the OAS decision, the U.S. would declare its intention to end its economic blockade of Cuba, and lift other restrictions on travel and Cuban participation in specialized conferences and sporting events held in the U.S.
4. With this reestablishment, the U.S. and Cuba could start the long and difficult process of negotiating the new foundation on which mutually acceptable relations between the two countries would rest. Among these basic issues are:
 - a) trade agreement, including the resumption of traditional Cuban sugar exports to the U.S.,
 - b) compensation settlement for nationalized U.S. properties. (Although the Castro government postponed any such settlement indefinitely, it never denied ultimate responsibility for such indemnification),
 - c) refugee interests,
 - d) the future of Guantanamo Bay (a strong case could be made that both the U.S. Naval Base and the Soviet missile emplacements are obsolete and thoroughly useless, even if a military engagement between the two nations were to occur. As evidence, one could cite the Bay of Pigs experience where neither a naval presence or a missile apparatus was of any value, and
 - e) cultural exchanges.

I am not suggesting an ideological change of heart is necessary, or even that such stages of a concordat would result in the internal liberalization of either of the two antagonists. The point is, that given the relative autonomy of foreign policy in both countries, one might expect a

genuine easing of hemispheric tensions. Surely problems will remain. No attempt is being made to compromise the integrity of the two regimes involved--or the worth of capitalism or socialism as such. However, if the U.S.-Cuban relations are to be different in the future, some such program of staged cooperation will become necessary.

APPENDIX A
WEIS CODE
(Event Interaction Survey)

1. YIELD

- 011 Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest, etc.
- 012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate
- 013 Admit wrongdoing: retract statement

2. COMMENT

- 021 Explicit decline to comment
- 022 Comment on situation - pessimistic
- 023 Comment on situation - neutral
- 024 Comment on situation - optimistic
- 025 Explain policy or future position

3. CONSULT

- 031 Meet with; at neutral site; or send note; stay in same place
- 032 Visit; go to; leave country
- 033 Receive visit; host

4. APPROVE

- 041 Praise, hail, applaud, condolences, ceremonial greetings, thanks
- 042 Endorse others policy or position, give verbal support

5. PROMISE

- 051 Promise own policy support
- 052 Promise material support
- 053 Promise other future support action
- 054 Assure; reassure

6. GRANT

- 061 Express regret; apologize
- 062 Give state invitation
- 063 Grant asylum
- 064 Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition; de facto relations, etc.

- 065 Suspend negative sanctions, truce
- 066 Release and/or return persons or property

7. REWARD

- 071 Extend economic aid (gift and/or loan)
- 072 Extend military assistance; joint military exercises
- 073 Give other assistance

8. AGREE

- 081 Make substantive agreement
- 082 Agree to future action or procedure; agree to meet, to negotiate; accept state invitation

9. REQUEST

- 091 Ask for information
- 092 Ask for policy assistance; seek
- 093 Ask for material assistance
- 094 Request action; call for; ask for asylum
- 095 Entreat; plead for; appeal to; help

10. PROPOSE

- 101 Offer proposal
- 102 Urge or suggest action or policy

11. REJECT

- 111 Turn down proposal; reject protest demand, threat, etc.
- 112 Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow; exclude

Appendix A - Cont'd

- 12. ACCUSE
 - 121 Charge; criticize blame disapprove
 - 122 Denounce; denigrate; abuse; condemn
- 13. PROTEST
 - 131 Make complaint (not formal)
 - 132 Make formal complaint or protest
- 14. DENY
 - 141 Deny an accusation
 - 142 Deny an attributed policy, action, role, or position
- 15. DEMAND
 - 150 Issue order or command, insist; demand compliance, etc.
- 16. WARN
 - 160 Give warning
- 17. THREATEN
 - 171 Threat without specific negative sanctions
 - 172 Threat with specific non-military negative sanctions
 - 173 Threat with force specified
 - 174 Ultimatum; threat with negative sanctions and time limit specified
- 18. DEMONSTRATE
 - 181 Non-military demonstration; walk out on; boycott
 - 182 Armed force mobilization, exercise, and/or display
- 19. REDUCE RELATIONSHIP (as Neg. Sanction)
 - 191 Cancel or postpone planned event
 - 192 Reduce routine international activity; recall officials, etc.
 - 193 Reduce or suspend aid or assistance
 - 194 Halt negotiations
 - 195 Break diplomatic relations
- 20. EXPEL
 - 201 Order personnel out of country; deport
 - 202 Expel organization of group
- 21. SEIZE
 - 211 Seize position or possessions
 - 212 Detain or arrest person(s)
- 22. FORCE
 - 221 Non-injury destructive act, bomb with no one hurt
 - 222 Non-military injury-destruction
 - 223 Military engagement

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOM., CULT., SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1=4 2=0 3=0	1=2 2=0 3=1	1=3 2=0 3=0	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1=1 3=1 2=0	1=2 3=5 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=0	SEE CODING RULES FOR CATEGORY DEFINITION
BLOC DEVIANTS	1=0 3=0 2=0	1=0 3=2 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1=0 3=2 2=0	1=0 3=1 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=0	
U.S.	1=0 3=1 2=0	1=0 3=1 2=6	1=1 3=0 2=1	
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1=0 3=1 2=1	1=1 3=0 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=1	
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1=0 3=1 2=1	1=0 3=0 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=4	
PRC	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1=0 3=0 2=0	1=1 3=1 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	
MID-EAST	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	
LATIN AMERICA	1=2 3=1 2=7	1=1 3=0 2=2	1=0 3=0 2=0	
OUTLIERS	1=0 3=1 2=0	1=2 3=2 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1=6 3=0 2=0	1=2 3=1 2=0	1=2 3=0 2=0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1=0 3=1 2=2	1=0 3=0 2=1	1=0 3=0 2=0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1=0 3=1 2=0	1=0 3=1 2=0	1=0 3=0 2=0	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE		1		
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR		2		
CHILE BROADCASTS		1		
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.	3			
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	24	8	3	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE				NO. FOR BRDCST.
	NO. OF BROADCAST			64
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	4			NO. FOR BRDCST.
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 1				35

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOM., CULT., SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 1 2= 0 3= 2	1= 0 2= 0 3= 2	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 1 2= 0 3= 2	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	SEE
U.S.	1= 0 2= 1 3= 3	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	CODING
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 1 2= 2 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 2	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	RULES
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 1 3= 0	FOR
PRC	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	CATEGORY
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	DEFINITION
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 0 2= 1 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	
MID-EAST	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 0 2= 2 3= 1	1= 0 2= 1 3= 1	1= 0 2= 1 3= 0	
OUTLIERS	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 6 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 2= 1 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEFENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR				
CHILE BROADCASTS		3		
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.				
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	13	18	21	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CND.	REUNIF- ICATION		NO. FOR BRDCST.
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE		1 Korea		45
	NO. OF BROADCAST			NO. FOR BRDCST.
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	3			
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 2				52

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOM., CULT, SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1= 3 2= 0 3= 1	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR ELOC SUPTRS.	1= 2 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 2 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
ELOC DEVIANTS	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 2 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	SEE CODING RULES FOR CATEGORY DEFINITION
U.S.	1= 0 3= 5 2= 2 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 2	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 0 3= 0 2= 1 3= 0	1= 0 3= 2 2= 0 3= 2	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	
PRC	1= 2 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 2 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 3 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 2 3= 0 2= 4 3= 0	1= 0 3= 1 2= 1 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	
OUTLIERS	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 7 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 1 2= 3 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 2 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	1= 3= 3= 0 2= 3= 3= 0	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR			2	
CHILE BROADCASTS		7		
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.	1			
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	22	7	18	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		NO. FOR. BRDCST.
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE				56
	NO. OF BROADCAST			NO. DOM. BRDCST.
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	1			
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 3				47

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOM., CULT, SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 1 3= 3 2= 0 3= 0	1= 7 3= 2 2= 0 3= 0	1= 2 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 17 3= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 5 3= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	SEE CODING RULES FOR CATEGORY DEFINITION
U.S.	1= 0 3= 7 2= 23 3= 0	1= 0 3= 1 2= 4 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 6 3= 0	
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 2 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 0 3= 0 2= 2 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 1 3= 0	
PRC	1= 0 3= 4 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	1= 3= 3= 3 2= 3= 3= 3	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 2 3= 3 2= 1 3= 0	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OUTLIERS	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 3 3= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 8 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 2 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 1 2= 1 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 3 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR				
CHILE BROADCASTS		3	3	
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.				
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	60	14	22	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		NO. FOR. BRDCST.
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE				
	NO. OF BROADCAST			90
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	1			NO. FOR. BRDCST.
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 4				96

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOM., CULT, SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 6 3= 5 2= 0 3= 3	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 3 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 4 3= 3 2= 0 3= 3	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 4 2= 0 3= 4	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	SEE
U.S.	1= 0 3= 5 2= 14 3= 5	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	CODING
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 2 2= 0 3= 2	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	RULES
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	FOR
PRC	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	CATEGORY
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	DEFINITION
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 4 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	
MID-EAST	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 7 3= 1 2= 4 3= 1	1= 0 3= 3 2= 0 3= 3	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OUTLIERS	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 10 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 2 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	1= 3 3= 0 2= 3 3= 0	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR				
CHILE BROADCASTS		4		
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.				
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	31	2	8	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		NO. FOR. BRDCST.
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE		1 N/SVN		72
	NO. OF BROADCAST			NO. DOM. BRDCST.
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	7			
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 5				41

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC, CULT, SCIEN.	MILITARY	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR	1= 3 2= 0 3= 1	1= 3 2= 0 3= 5	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	SEE CODING RULES FOR CATEGORY DEFINITION
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 2 3= 1	1= 6 3= 4	1= 0 3= 0	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 8 3= 0	1= 1 3= 2	1= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 2 3= 1	1= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0	
U.S.	1= 10 3= 5	1= 5 3= 0	1= 0 3= 1	
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 3=	1= 3=	1= 3=	
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	
PRC	1= 3=	1= 3=	1= 3=	
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3=	1= 3=	1= 3=	
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 1 3= 2	1= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 3 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST	1= 3=	1= 3=	1= 3=	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 5 3= 1	1= 6 3= 1	1= 2 3= 1	
OUTLIERS	1= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 3 3= 0	1= 1 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE		2		
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR			1	
CHILE BROADCASTS		6		
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.	1			
	FAV/PRAIS.	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	22	3	6	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE				NO. FOR BRDCST.
	NO. OF BROADCAST			76
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES				NO. FOR BRDCST.
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 6				31

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	USSR, CHINA, MIDDLE EAST, SCIENCE, CULTURE	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 1 3= 4 2= 0 3= 4	1= 2 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 14 3= 3 2= 0 3= 3	1= 3 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	SEE
U.S.	1= 7 3= 3 2= 0 3= 3	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	CODING
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	RULES
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	FOR
PRC	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	CATEGORY
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	DEFINITION
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 0 3= 5 2= 0 3= 5	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 6 3= 4 2= 3 3= 4	1= 0 3= 3 2= 0 3= 3	1= 1 3= 1 2= 1 3= 1	
OUTLIERS	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	1= 3= 3 2= 3= 3	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR				
CHILE BROADCASTS	1	3		
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.				
	FAV/PRAISE	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	15	2	2	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		NO. FOR. BRDCST.
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE				69
	NO. OF BROADCAST			NO. DOM. BRDCST.
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	4			
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 7				19

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOMY, CULT, SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 5 2= 0 3= 1	1= 3 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 2 2= 0 3= 0	1= 3 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	SEE
U.S.	1= 2 2= 2 3= 2	1= 0 2= 2 3= 1	1= 0 2= 1 3= 0	CODING
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 0 2= 2 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 1 3= 0	RULES
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 0 2= 1 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	FOR
PRC	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	CATEGORY
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	1= 3 2= 3=	DEFINITION
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 2 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
MID-EAST	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 3 2= 0 3= 1	1= 6 2= 0 3= 3	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OUTLIERS	1= 1 2= 0 3= 0	1= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 2 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 2= 0 3= 1	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 1 2= 0 3= 1	1= 2 2= 0 3= 0	1= 0 2= 0 3= 0	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.				
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR	1			
CHILE BROADCASTS	5			
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.	1			
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	18	1	5	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNF.	REUNIF- ICATION		
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE		1 Korea		
	NO. OF BROADCAST			
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	2			
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 8				24

APPENDIX B

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

	POLITICAL	ECONOM., CULT, SCIEN.	MILITARY	
USSR	1= 1 3= -1 2= 0	1= 2 3= 2 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	1=FAV. 2=UNFAV. 3=NEUT.
USSR BLOC SUPTRS.	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0	1= 4 3= 1 2= 0	1= 2 3= 0 2= 0	
BLOC DEVIANTS	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	1= 2 3= 1 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	
MID-EAST SOV. SYMP.	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	SEE
U.S.	1= 1 3= 8 2= 6	1= 0 3= 0 2= 7	1= 0 3= 0 2= 2	CODING
NATO, U.S. ALLIES	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	1= 8 3= 1 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	RULES
U.S. PAC/ASIAN ALLY	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	FOR
PRC	1= 0 3= -1 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	CATEGORY
NON-ALIGN. ASIA/PAC	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	DEFINITION
NON-ALIGN. AFRICA	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	
NON-ALIGN. EUROPE	1= 0 3= 1 2= 0	1= 0 3= 3 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	
MID-EAST	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	1= 3= 2=	
LATIN AMERICA	1= 7 3= 1 2= 2	1= 5 3= 3 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	
OUTLIERS	1= 1 3= 0 2= 0	1= 0 3= 3 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	
COMMUNIST ASIA	1= 3 3= 0 2= 0	1= 2 3= 1 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	
OAS ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 1 2= 3	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	
U. N. ORGANIZATION	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	1= 1 3= 1 2= 0	1= 0 3= 0 2= 0	
NUMBER OF BRDCST.	ADVERSE	FAVORABLE	NEUTRAL	
USSR DEPENDENCE				
RENEWED U.S. RELAT.		2		
CUBA AS INSTR. USSR				
CHILE BROADCASTS	4			
	PROMOTES	OPPOSES	NEUTRAL	
REVOL. IN L.A.				
	FAV/PRAIS	SELF-CRT.	NEUTRAL	
CUBA DOMESTIC, ECON/ POLIT/EDUC/RELIG	21	0	12	
	PROMOTES 2 NAT. CNP.	REUNIF- ICATION		NO. FOR. BRDCST.
NORTH/SOUTH DISPUTE				67
	NO. OF BROADCAST			NO. DOM. BRDCST.
SPT. FOR OTHER WORLD COMM. PARTIES	5			
APPENDIX B Content Analysis Results for Period 9				33

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
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